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judgment, — for there does lie an axiomatic faith at the root of every judgment ; 
that that faith which lies at the root of every moral judgment ; and that 
ultimate faith, the result of all, by which we grasp eternal realities, were but 
different exercises of the self-same faculty of reason. All these he spoke of 
as pertaining to the reason as distinguished from the understanding, thus 
confusing the whole subject. Now, while there is a certain general resemblance, 
there are such essential distinctions between these various exercises of reason, 
some lying at the beginning of all thought, and others at the perfection of all 
thought, that should have led Coleridge to a scientific distinction between the 
various kinds of faith, or exercises of intuitive reason. Mr. Poyer did not 
sufficiently bear this in mind when he spoke of our receiving St. Paul’s 
Cathedral as an act of faith. That is a complex kind of faith, which we 
do not receive all at once. The eye, in every act of vision, sees something 
and holds to it; but yet what the eye sees is not that which the mind 
comes to realize. An infant, we say, sees its father ; but what the child 
sees is not a complex living person, but merely an image upon the retina ; 
and there is a process of acquired conceptions and associations of a com- 
plex character before the child has lost that first imperfection of childish 
perception and acquired all that belongs to the ordinary powers of vision, so 
as to realize at once the objects which come and go before it. This will clear 
away some misconceptions. Then, with regard to faith and reason being 
harmonized, I agree with much that Mr. Row has said. I believe that faith 
— when we come to the higher faith, that faith which apprehends and grasps 
eternal verities — must in a sense repose upon the basis of reason. If you 
reduce and narrow that basis too much, you will cut away the ground upon 
which all the defences of revelation itself must rest from beneath your feet. 
We must all be rationalists in one sense, and I regret that the term “rational- 
ist ” has been absorbed by a party which makes out reason to be contrary 
to faith. I deeply regret that. As for faith and reason in their respective 
spheres, again I believe I am correct in saying that Mr. Row has tried to teach 
us that the infinite was to be apprehended equally by faith and by reason, 
each on its own account and after its respective manner 
Mr. Row.— Certainly. 
Dr. Rigg. — At the same time, I agree with the gentlemen who have said 
that the mathematical infinite has nothing on earth to do with the moral 
infinite. It only introduces a confusion into the subject which is quite need- 
less. What can the mathematical infinite have to do with any moral or 
metaphysical argument ? When you apply the term “ infinite ” to mathe- 
matical or physical science you are almost guilty of an abuse of terms. As for 
infinite space, I think it can be nothing more than an infinite deal of nothing. 
(Laughter.) It would seem to be nothing else than emptiness conceived as a 
possible condition of being — as a possible condition of matter. The more we 
talk of infinity, the more we are puzzled and bothered by terms which have 
no significance. As to the moral infinite, we should entirely relieve ourselves 
from all difficulties introduced into the subject by these references to a 
mathematical or ^asi-material infinite. I am not prepared to give up the 
