34 
of arguments as those which have been advanced, would be a bold man — 
much bolder than I find Atheists generally are. Several of the points which 
have been referred to and commented upon by Dr. Rigg are points which I 
had marked myself as requiring some notice ; and the first was that with 
regard to Comte being alluded to as an inductive philosopher. I do not, 
however, suppose that Dr. Irons considers Comte to be truly an inductive 
philosopher ; but I understood him rather to mean that Comte puts himself 
forward as an inductive philosopher and calls himself one. Comte, no doubt, 
considers himself par excellence an inductive philosopher ; but Dr. Irons 
expressly states that he does not regard him so, because in the concluding 
sentence of the paragraph (partly quoted by Dr. Rigg) he says, — “ If any of 
us complain of the Positivism of the present hour, it is not for its appeal to 
facts ; it is because of its not examining the whole fields That means, it dis- 
regards some facts. At the same time we would gain nothing by coming 
forward and casting in their teeth that they are not inductive philosophers 
because they disregard facts. I think that the way in which Dr. Irons has 
treated the opposite side, namely with every courtesy and kindness, is one 
that deserves commendation. Calling of names is not to be admired as a 
rule ; and I am only sorry that in the controversial papers which we some- 
times necessarily have here, it has not been always possible to avoid doing so. 
But we have had the gauntlet thrown down to us rather roughly, and I do 
not see why we should be more tender in this respect than the opposite side ; 
for we are bound to express our thoughts, and are free to speak as plainly as 
they do. In regard to another point which Dr. Rigg has criticised, — we 
know that we ourselves exist by being conscious of it ; but we are equally 
conscious of the non ego, or of what we see around us. The ego and non 
ego are co-relatives. The one, you will find if you think deeply, implies 
the existence of the other. There are two points besides, which I wish to 
notice. Dr. Irons says, that we approve of an act or not from what it is. 
The argument drawn from this, I think, might even be strengthened ; because 
it is not merely the act itself which leads us to approve of it ; but, when we 
can discover it, the intention of the act. That makes the argument all the 
stronger in favour of what Dr. Irons has advanced. For there is another 
important passage in which he says (at the commencement of the fifth 
section, § 27) — 
u We have arrived, then, at a more advanced conclusion as to the conscious 
agent whose action is recognized by others as praiseworthy or not, as good or 
evil, according as he has been its determiner, unrestrained by external com- 
pulsion of any kind and not fixed to action by internal law or constitution.” 
The consideration of that is of very great consequence. It helps us to 
understand better one of the most consoling and most important principles of 
Christian ethics, respecting our incapacity for judging others. Because, if 
you consider what Dr. Irons states here, you will see that we never can know 
all as regards others, which we can know as regards ourselves. We never 
can know all the influences which bear upon them, arising from their habits, 
