anything to guide it, that it is to look at itself and judge for itself, and that, 
apart from all things outward, it can get the idea of causation ? I think not. 
“ The mind reflects on itself, and adjudicates on the manifestations of 
external being ; it adjudicates by its own essence.” 
I entirely agree in that 
Dr. Irons. — That is all I want to imply. 
Dr. Rigg. — Dr. Irons says that that is all he means. Then I entirely agree 
with him ; but I thought that the language which I have read did not seem 
to be consistent exactly with the principle expressed in that sentence. There 
is another sentence to which I wish to call attention. Dr. Irons says that 
“Aristotle was as truly an inductive philosopher as Bacon, and Bacon as 
much as Comte.” In the sense which I suppose this sentence is intended 
to bear, I do not precisely accord with it. I don’t suppose that Comte 
was an inductive philosopher, though no doubt he has written much about 
the inductive method. I do not think that Bacon was an inductive philo- 
sopher, although he was the father of inductive philosophy. Aristotle 
certainly did not teach how, on any definite method of induction, to 
attain truth by examining the nature and history of facts, but I sup- 
pose that there was a germ of the Baconian inductive philosophy 
in Aristotle that might be fairly developed into something Baconian. I 
suppose that Bacon really taught inductive philosophy, but his works give us 
specimens of the inversion of inductive philosophy, especially when he 
directs his attention to speculations in regard to nature, or to questions of 
physical or metaphysical properties. I suppose that Comte, though un- 
questionably an exponent of inductive philosophy, and though upon his own 
view of it, he professed to teach a philosophy of his own consistent with in- 
duction, yet would hardly be admitted by many, and by none, except 
the most enthusiastic of his own followers, to be a very choice or illustrious 
instance of an inductive philosopher. I think that his philosophy is one 
which does not base itself upon facts. I should be very sorry to admit that 
his was inductive philosophy ; and I think that Dr. Irons has gone some way 
in the paper to show us that Comte’s philosophy can hardly be said to be a 
true induction from facts. I think, therefore, that we should be a little 
careful as to how readily we give the title of inductive philosopher to such 
a man as Comte. Considering the exceeding accuracy with which Dr. Irons 
generally speaks on these matters, and knowing his discrimination, I think 
that on that point he has given the adversary inadvertently a little advantage 
which it was altogether needless to give. I merely wish, in conclusion, to 
say that the appeal made at the end of the very able paper in regard to the 
necessity of a supreme principle and governing power, strikes me as just 
opening a vein of thought which it is of the utmost importance for us at the 
present time to keep in view. Surely we must abide by the principle that 
“ there is no alternative but this : we must disclaim all honour and all shame ; 
resist all the facts of human nature’s accountable existence here ; or acknow- 
ledge a Supreme power which knows the whole responsible community and 
