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I do not know whether Dr. Irons means “ before these ; ” but, as far as I can 
judge from the preceding context, as well as that which follows, his mean- 
ing seems to be that we must have some thoughts prior to the experience 
of phenomena. The illustration proceeds : — 
“ Supposing our experience of various phenomena to suggest the general 
idea of a cause, yet how came we by the previous thought that there should 
be a cause ? ” 
But if the phenomena suggested the general idea of a cause, how could the 
thought of a cause be previous to the phenomena ? “ If the phenomena sug- 
gest the general idea of a cause,” I presume that, this is in accordance with 
what is generally accepted in the analysis of our own experience. There is a 
mind. That mind, until it has the stimulus of some outward phenomena — 
until, in some way or other, the sensibilities with which we are endowed 
are brought into play, — I presume is generally understood to remain in a 
condition of blankness. I suppose that it has powers, and that these powers 
are not thoughts nor ideas, and moreover that they are latent. I suppose 
that it is not until after the phenomena of the outward world — in fact, objective 
things — have been brought into contact with the mind, that anything like 
consciousness in the mind itself, as distinct and apart from outward things, 
can possibly arise. I suppose that our mere perception is in some sense and 
some degree analogous to the perception of the inferior creatures. There must 
be, before there is the consciousness which belongs to the human being, a sense 
of “I myself,” I suppose, further, that there must not only be a sense of “ego,” 
but some act of volition before an idea of causation can arise ; and it is from 
the fact of our exerting will consciously, with a definite purpose and a sense 
of “ I myself,” feeling that we have a power to cause something, that a 
general idea of causation arises. And this being taken in connection with 
what is seen and felt outwardly, produces the general idea of causation exist- 
ing in the mind. That is the state of the case so far as I can judge ; and the 
sentences which I have read either do not clearly express Dr. Irons’s meaning, 
or do not accord with the general understanding — or, I think, with general 
experience — in regard to these points. Then, says Dr. Irons, “ that there 
should be a cause is an idea superior to the phenomena ” ; but the question 
is, is it prior to the phenomena ? That is the real question. I suggest that 
it is not, so far as the individual subject and agent is concerned. He goes on 
to say : — 
“This is an idea superior to the phenomena. For this, the mind has no 
resource but itself.” 
But if the mind had not been brought into contact with the outward world, 
I suppose that that idea would not have arisen in it at all. Again, “ Expe- 
rience does not teach us this.” I presume that experience does not teach 
it alone, not without the intuitive power or principle, — whether that is 
implied all through or not. (Hear, hear.) But can we say that the intuitive 
power and principle gives us the idea by itself, that the mind is not to take 
