17 
itself (as the subject) would have relation with that object : 
all the phenomenal being later [i. e. in modo concijpiendi) . It 
is true indeed that even some abstractions are measures of 
phenomenal and contingent being; but all are not so. Col- 
lective and general terms, for instance, are abstractions partly 
derived from the phenomena of experience ; but In ttis dual _ 
some thoughts we certainly have more abstract than {t y we must 
. . mi 0 J . r, . separate the 
these. Inus, supposing our experience ot various thinker from 
phenomena to suggest the general idea of a cause ; hls thought - 
yet how came we by the more abstract thought, that there should 
be a cause ? This is an idea superior to the phenomena. For 
this the mind has recourse to itself, and its sense of the anterior. 
Experience alone does not teach us this ; rather experience is 
itself taught, influenced, and guided at last by this recognized 
truth. The mind reflecting on itself adjudicates, by its 
own essence, on the manifestations of external being. It 
does not know how the manifestations of unconscious beings 
reach the conscious being : it only knows the fact. It does 
not know how itself is capable of reflecting on external, and 
even inferior beings ; here, too, it only knows the 
fact. The agent stands in relation of some kind st 2s in're£ 
with the outer, or phenomenal world : he stands p^o^ai! 10 
also in relation to an inner world, which (for want and also to the 
of a better term) we call the “ abstract ” and the true ' alwaya * 
“ true-always.” (§ 100.) 
29. Whatever be the essence of the mind or conscious 
agent, it is that which can contemplate outer life and action, 
and attempt by some inner criterion the decision of the pos- 
sible and right. It falls back on its own essential relation 
to the necessary, and the “ always-true,” however indistinct 
it be, (as is life itself), in every emergency which The relation 
demands a decision. In the power then to make of the mind, 
n • t i n essentially to 
such, decision irom oar own internal resources, and the “ true-ai. 
in this alone, can we uniformly trace the beginnings beginning of 
of that “good” which, in action, we afterwards call A\ e he good ”° f 
“moral;” andwhich is distinct from the agent. (§ 76.) 
30. Further : There is a sameness of moral agency, if viewed 
largely, which is as unquestionable as the sameness of the pheno- 
menal world. The great varieties of sensation and 
o Tm reference 
perception in the human race do not disturb our be- to “the good” 
lief of the sameness of the outer experiences of men *of 
in all parts of the world, and in all ages ; neither can conscious 
the variations and eccentricities or moral agency 
alter the general laws of the praiseworthy and the blameable in 
conduct, in relation to which each conscious agent has to 
make such frequent decisions of his own. It is this sameness 
VOL. iv. c 
