u 
a n a ct ’s being gut 0 f pi m g e lf we here know no more : we only 
know that he determines the act, which we approve 
or not, for what it is ; while we praise or blame him for con- 
sciously doing, or originating, or determining it. 
The frequent mystification of this truth in necessitarian 
writers arises simply from the suicidal hypothesis which they 
assume, that the agent is a mere point, or passive abstrac- 
tion, in other words, a nonentity acted on by some such 
abstractions as “ motives,” “inducements,” and so on. 
22. At the risk of a seeming, but not real, repetition of our 
argument, it is indispensable that we here concentrate atten- 
tion on this idea of “contingency,” — that possibility of an 
Further ob ac ti° n,s being or not being, — upon which, as on a 
servation of middle point, the conscious agent has his stand in 
in C ° n conlciou3 determining action, both the laudable and the blame- 
agency. able. If doubt had not been deliberately expressed 
by some, and indistinctly assumed by others, we might not 
thus need to pause to ask, — whether a contingency, (or the 
possibility of an actions either being or not being), is admis- 
sible in philosophy? We must not be diverted 
now from this, by any indirect issues; for the 
entire idea of a morality is changed by any inde- 
cision here. Once establish in the mind an 
unequivocal belief in a true (not partial) contin- 
gency, and a way is made towards a solution of countless 
questions of sophistical reasoning : Thus, “ Whether human 
action may be calculated beforehand ? ” “ Whether a higher 
intelligence than ours may e foresee 3 all human action and 
its issues ?” &c. are questions evidently connected with the 
previous decision as to Contingency. 
(Collateral 23. That outward circumstances may with consi- 
poltponed.) be derable precision be “ calculated ” and “ foreseen,” 
we can fully understand : our social life could not 
proceed on any other supposition. Our human calculations may 
go even farther, and deal with probabilities ; and beyond this, 
superhuman intelligence may regard all possibilities of action. 
But the relation of either foresight or calculation to the un- 
The whole determined must be for subsequent consideration. 
(§ 138.) The point to be settled about Contin- 
gency is, not whether everything, but whether 
something in human action is really determined by 
the man, as, quoad hoc, the middle 'point between 
being and not being ? To deny this, is to make the conscious 
agent to be passive, or even nothing, and unconscious things 
to be acting on him. 
24. To say thus that a conscious agent is not a real being, 
Denial of 
anterior con- 
tingency chan- 
ges all the ideas 
of accountabi- 
lity. 
issue. — Whe- 
ther the con- 
scious agent 
determines 
something 
himself ? 
