facts of human nature itself, viewed in the largest way, 
should be the basis of our analysis. It is a fact, We mark the 
at least, that man does not praise, and per- t^ed n in W oar 
ceives that he ought not to blame, any one for an analysis, 
action which is wholly the result of external compulsion or 
necessity. 
19. Here, however, we stand but on the threshold of our 
subject, though so significant a result has been arrived at. 
“ Goodness " both as to its personal appreciation by man, 
and its intellectual definition, is yet only imperfectly stated. 
But it is necessary that each step we take, if but slight, should 
be sure — each conclusion gained, a fact. Our natural capacity 
and readiness to approve or disapprove, to praise or blame, 
practically settles that virtue or personal goodness is in 
some degree possible; for we cannot think man's nature 
wholly false in witnessing to this. 
We have distinguished our approbation of that which itself is 
good, from our approbation of it as in relation with th t 
the conscious agent, or doer. The distinction also is we must fur- 
based evidently on fact . But to clear it yet more ^ at STeon- 
we must inquire somewhat further as to what we 
meant at the outset (§8) by a Conscious Agent, 
i.e. the being whom we distinguish as a “ Person." 
IV. 
20. It sufficed to say, at first, that a conscious agent is 
recognized as a Person rather than a Thing. This meant 
that a Thing does not consciously originate that which is to be ; 
and that a Person is believed by us so to determine a result, 
every time we reasonably blame or praise him. Thus, in 
the praise which we give to a person, there may be 
elements, {e. g. gratitude), which we could not pos- Praise of 
sibly bestow on a thing*, as such. But if our appro- conscious agen- 
bation implies, m any case, determining power fact “Contin- 
in the conscious agent, it also implies that that fo3>iiity° r of 
agent might have refrained from putting forth that fratom g or frJ>m 
act of power. Now this antecedent possibility of doin g- 
acting, or refraining from acting, is what is usually and briefly 
expressed by the term “ Contingency." 
21. It is evident that no description of the circumstances 
and conditions of a conscious agent can, a3 such, tell us what the 
conscious agent is in himself. He holds the position between 
the being and not being of a possible action. The a conscious 
world accepts it as his action if he determines it. poSt between 
