12 
Limits of 
both an ex- 
terior and in- 
terior kind to 
be distinguish- 
ed. 
limited" Free- Unlimited Freedom is impossible, being a contra- 
st isimpos " diction. Every beings by the fact of his existing 
such as he is, is so far determined, that he is not 
any other. He is not, and cannot be, infinitely mutable, or 
infinitely free. His present existence, while it endures, 
implies a limit. What “ he is” will limit what he “ can do ” ; 
and as was said generally, so again in a special sense it 
may be repeated, the deontology depends on the ontology. 
And not only is an agent defined, or limited, by 
his own essence and constitution, but every act, 
immediately it has become an act, is a determinate 
thing ; and the doer may find himself further 
limited by what he has done. If ever the phrase 
“ free action ” is used of an accomplished result, it can only 
These limits, mean that the agent was not externally forced to do 
exterior ,diffeiv it. And the interior necessity, which arises from the 
entiate agency, constitution and limits of any being, must not be 
assumed to be more than negative. It says, “ hitherto 
mayest thou go, and no further.” But exterior compulsion, 
or necessity, we all own, intercepts just accountability, and 
is inconsistent with that goodness which is the object of 
approbation, as “ free.” In saying this, we are but stating 
a fact. 
17. How far the agent may himself remain vir- 
tuous, while under compulsion which he deprecates, 
is a divergent inquiry, co-incident with, but not 
intercepting, the present argument. 
It may be remarked, as we proceed, that this distinction, 
of what Aquinas calls “ natural and absolute neces- 
sity,” and “necessity of compulsion,” “ quas omnino 
repugnat voluntati,” is familiar to the mediaeval 
schools. 
If the known laws of the world, or any outer events, inter- 
fere with the agency of man, so that in any case it cannot be 
said, (as Aquinas puts it), “homo seijpsum movet ad agendum ,” 
the accountability to which we hold him is limited, or may be 
even destroyed. 
Minute ques- 18. We must not encumber our examination at 
tions must not , i • ■ , m • . , • , 
intrude here, this point with any minuter questions as to some 
abnormal, unjustified, and partial conditions of 
human nature, in reference to the approbation of good, or the 
shame at evil. As physical philosophy assumes the goodness 
of nature as a whole, notwithstanding all exceptional appear- 
ances, and aims to learn rather than criticise ; so the philo- 
sophy of humanity must regard man as constituted capable 
of action and human goodness. We premised that the 
Exterior 
compulsion in- 
terferes with 
just accounta- 
bility in the 
agent. 
(Mediaeval 
view.) 
{Sum., lib. i. 
q. 82.) 
