11 
But here 
arises the ques- 
tion “ What is 
Eight ? ” or 
“ goodness ”? 
after all, do we mean by “ right ” ? Can we define “ virtue 99 ? 
What is that “ goodness,” a belief in which, and a 
demand for which, is found to be so natural? — We 
must not avoid this : it is justly pressed by every 
one who is honestly dealing with such questions ; 
and is the next point to be considered. What we have said 
thus far only touches the primary and apparent facts. 
There are some actions, then, (we need not specify them, or 
any of them, for no one will deny it), the perception of which, 
by other men besides the agents, is followed by quick approval. 
This approbation is sometimes an immediate sympathy with 
that which is done, as being felt to be noble, great, true, 
good (in whatever terms “ the right 99 may be 
expressed). Suppose it has been a matter not at all 0 fapprob«Son 
concerning ourselves ; or that we have had no time 
to refer to self; or that it was some historical or 
poetical heroism that had aroused our feeling, still the fact 
remains. Whether we can do anything towards fixing the 
definition of this fact, may be uncertain. That will depend 
on language, and many conditions of cultivated thought. But 
facts do not wait on definitions. In ontology the idea of 
Goodness is de facto fitness to the ends ; but in deontology, 
we consider the doer as well as the thing done — fitness in 
acting as well as in the act. 
15. It may be urged that this feeling of (C approbation might 
be stirred for the thing done, as seen in useful 
results, and not as pertaining to the doer.” This, 
of course, may be true ; and it sometimes is so. But 
this is evidently not the whole case, even if it be the best 
part of it — which few would say. If an act of apparent 
justice were forced on the doer, we might be glad it was 
attained, but our approbation would not be the same as when 
we believed it to be originated by the agent him- 
self. And on the other hand, we should have 
sympathy, rightly, with a man who denied his 
responsibility for anything which was forced on him from 
without. 
16. If these be “ facts of human nature,” so certain that the 
opposites cannot be ordinarily supposed among 
human beings, it follows that an agent, or person, having there- 
held by us to be rightly accountable has some { £™* omeFree " 
kind and measure of “ Freedom,” or immunity 
at least from coercion. And thus the next point of examina- 
tion we find to be, — What is that kind of (t freedom 99 in an 
agent, which certain forms of approved action, or virtue, 
would seem, in/ act , to demand? 
both to the 
“ good ” in it- 
self, 
and to “good’ 
in the doer ; 
