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objective, external, palpable facts, the very grounds of thought? But I 
think Professor Kirk answers himself towards the end of the argument, for 
he uses the word “typical” in an objective sense on two or three occasions 
when he is referring to Agassiz. He says— “ Here we have Africa and its 
typical negro ” 
Mr. Reddie. — But I think he shows that the so-called typical negro was 
nothing like the real African. 
Mr. Poyer.— N o doubt he show T s that in this case it does not answer to 
the idea of Agassiz. There may be wrong conceptions as to terms, but I 
take it that that has nothing to do with the doctrine 
Mr. Reddie. — But Professor Kirk’s view is a very fair one : if the type 
is merely an erroneous idea, it cannot represent an actual thing — it is merely 
a fancy. 
Mr. Poyer. — But the question is whether there is anything objective 
answering to types 
Mr. Reddie. — I suppose you mean anything you may call a type. Pro- 
fessor Kirk does not object to your calling anything what you like, if you 
clearly understand the thing is not necessarily what you call it. 
Mr. Poyer. — I am much obliged for your suggestion. The next point 
that strikes me relates to the question of origin. Professor Kirk’s criticism 
of Mr. Darwin’s theory of origin comes to this : we are to go back, as it were, 
to the morning of creation, and then we are to consider whether the acorn 
precedes the oak or whether the oak precedes the acorn. If I understand 
Professor Kirk rightly, he is for the conception that the oak comes first and 
the acorn next 
The Chairman. — I must help Mr. Poyer out in this matter. I think a 
great many misapprehensions may be obviated if attention is paid to the first 
page, where Professor Kirk is answering the notions which men get from the 
phenomena of nature, to account for all things. He there shows how, by 
such premature reasoning, no reason can be arrived at at all. He says, — 
“ It is no doubt important that we should frankly face all such notions 
and put the reasonings by which men seek to sustain them to the test of 
sound and serious argument. To do so, we cannot rest satisfied with the 
teachings of what is frequently called science, to the exclusion of that which 
is regarded as philosophy. It is one of the grand delusions of a somewlint 
popular style of thought at the present day, that a man needs only to know 
phenomena in order to be truly intelligent in relation to nature.” 
I think the points Mr. Poyer has been raising are principally in relation to 
that passage. 
Mr. Poyer. — Yes ; but here is a passage which is phenomenal. He says : — 
“ What good reason can any one give why we should fancy that the origin 
of such a succession must be in the seed and not in the matured individual 
which produced, or, so to speak, terminated in that seed ? ” 
I say the good reason is given in universal knowledge, which shows the 
development by growth from seeds. It is not a question of secondary 
origin, but of primary origin 
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