87 
X. Early speculations as to the relation of the Supreme Being to the 
Finite, admitted by the Christian schools. 
Parmenides, and the Eleatics : (Logical tendency of Pantheism to 
Atheism). 
Confusion in the premisses : inaccuracy also in the inference. 
(The conscious being may not be confounded with the phenomena.) 
The Eleatic philosophy was resisted — and modified. 
The neo-Platonician view — semi-Eleatic. 
View of the Christian ante-Nicene doctors— less Eleatic. 
View of the Christian post-Nicene doctors — again more Eleatic. 
(Progress of Eleatic thought in the West.) 
Mediaeval and modern schools — Eleatic. 
The foundation-errors of this philosophy. 
The Eleatic 'premisses must be rejected ; 
and man must be in correspondence with the Supreme. 
(§ 60-72.) 
XI. Dependency of the finite. 
The conscious agent should approve what the Supreme approves. 
(Hence the largeness of the range of Responsibility.) 
How Relation of Dependence on the Supreme here arises. 
Certain acquired relations not unnatural : 
But imply diversity in some respects — as well as sameness. 
Beginnings of Goodness in the moral agent, compared with the Supreme 
Good. 
The Highest Goodness is Necessary Goodness. 
Hoav it is also voluntary ? — (Voluntariness not injured by interior 
determination.) 
Distinctions between the finite and the Supreme marked by the 
Finitude. 
The idea of “ the good,” distinct from that of the limit. 
Relation of the Supreme, and of the finite, to the true-always ; 
quoad naturam and quoad actum. 
Relation of the Supreme, and of the finite, to the phenomenal. 
(The bearing of this on moral contingency.) 
Relation of the Supreme to the continuous. — He possesses all things. 
Continuity of being and of action ; in the Supreme, and in the 
finite. (§ 73-84.) 
XII. Continuity of Goodness. 
How essential goodness goes forth into the actual ; 
Without increase, or diminishing, in the Supreme : 
But finite goodness grows , by continuing ; and by intelligence. 
An act may be voluntary without deliberation. 
Deliberation does not increase with all action ; — 
but may become less. 
Yet moral goodness cannot be wholly passive. 
(Practical summary thus far.) 
(§ 85-88.) 
