89 
IX. 
52. A Moral Governing Power, in suitable relation with the 
responsible agents of the whole human community , and in 
harmony with the always-true, cannot (for the reasons alleged, 
§ 48) be conceived of as Impersonal. The idea of the imper- 
sonal is, however, identical with the unconscious (§ 8) ; for 
we have seen that self-consciousness is the distinction between 
Person and Thing. A person acts, and knows it ; and if the 
Supreme Governing Power acts towards us, and T h e supreme 
knows it, and knows the fitness of acts, that Govern- ^° ra i ag Go p®*' 
ing Power is Personal, and has a character to which sonaiity. 
ours corresponds. 
We have already arrived very gradually at the inevitable 
conclusion, that (the nature of man being what it is, and the 
facts of that nature being the basis of its science) a Supreme 
Moral Governor is in such sense necessary, as to be only 
deniable by those who would reject from human life all that is 
regarded as moral : and further, we also perceive 
that it would involve a contradiction to deny suppos^tKn! 
Personal agency to this Supreme Moral Governor. [SSion c ° n * 
But some more explicit statement is now needed, 
as to the character of this Personal agency towards us. 
53. We first must say, generally, that the Supreme Governor, 
who is ultimately the Judge and Regulator of the mutual 
agencies of the responsible world, will judge in reference to 
the true-always. If it were not so, there would, as we saw (§ 50), 
be no common ground of judgment, and we might find ourselves 
misjudged in detail, and the foundations also of Deontology sub- 
verted by the Power which was to vindicate responsible action, 
but which proved to have a different character altogether. 
Let any one, indeed, suppose a Supreme Moral Governor 
without relation to the true-always ; there would not only, in 
that case, be no ground for any appeal to our consciousness, 
or our sense of responsibility, but the existence of any such 
Supreme Governor would have to be first established on dis- 
tinct grounds ; and even then, a message from Him, armed 
with external authority, real or apparent, could only overawe, 
stupefy, or terrify ; but could obtain no moral acquiescence. 
To separate fundamentally the character of the 
Governor and the governed, is no less than to re^pondenceTf 
render impossible all moral correspondence and ^^i ct b e e r .”^ g a11 
terminate at once all possible responsibility. 
