99 
75. It is evident, however, that this fact of Dependency on 
the Moral Governor (as well as those specific relations referred 
to), must imply some diversity , as well as a sameness and jmply di _ 
of moral nature. The relations between the superior verity as well 
and the inferior must needs be regarded irom two 
points of view — something being always implied on the one 
side which could not be on the other. 
We must, therefore, in our attempt to apprehend the moral 
goodness which man is to aim at and which the Further ana . 
Supreme will approve, mark these diversities or dis- lysis of good- 
tinctions, as well as the acknowledged sameness : ness ' 
and for this we must go back to what has been already pre- 
mised (§ 29) as to the beginnings of good in the moral agent. 
76. We said ; “ In the power or capacity to fall back on his 
own relation to the always-true, and to decide from his own 
resources, — in this, and in this alone, can we uniformly trace 
the beginnings of that good which, in action, we call moral, and 
which is distinct from the agent.” — We must analyze this next. 
Some finite beings are capable of moral goodness ; and 
some are not. Inferior ranks of beings mav have „ . . 
excellence of their own, i.e. fitness to their end; goodnessinthe 
but it is not moral, if unconscious. They are moralagent - 
excellent as Things. When, however, we speak of a 
conscious responsible agent as “ capable ” of determining 
good action, and so beginning it, we, at once, suppose 
that he can also determine evil. A finite being capable 
of goodness which is to be praised as voluntary, discovers 
that he is capable of some limited action of his own : he 
falls back on his own powers. In this capacity lies an alter- 
native. There is “ may be ” or ff may not be.” He is not an 
agent necessarily good. His capacity for goodness is itself a 
good, but that is in another sense ; that is not a good for which 
he is to be applauded. 
77. But how, on the other hand, can we estimate the goodness 
of the Supreme? We cannot even think of it as compared 
other than essential to Him. It would be im- with the su- 
possible to attribute to Him a capacity for good- preme Good ' 
ness, in our alternative sense; for that would be finite : but 
He must be no less than Supreme Conscious Good in essential 
and eternal relation with the abstract, the true-always. If 
He were not such, we reiterate, He would not be that Supreme 
Governor which true moral responsibility demands (§ 48). 
Here then we have an original distinction between the 
Supreme and ourselves; and it results from His being Supreme. 
In Him there is no beginning to be good; as being Supreme, 
He ever exists, and is ever good. His fitness of Being is eternal. 
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