100 
The opposite thought — that He ever had been evil, — a being 
with no fitness to be, — were a contradiction as well as a 
blasphemy. He is thus Governor of all : His mind 
g oodnes h 3 ,ghe is being in essential relation with the true-always. 
necessary His ac tion towards finite conscious beings and 
towards the phenomenal universe, must accord with 
His own nature as good ; it must ever be so, for He is perfect, 
and not affected by habit (§ 48). We conclude, then, that 
the highest goodness is necessaky goodness. 
78. In what sense, then, we next ask, is the Divine Goodness 
voluntary, and not fatalistic ? In what sense, i.e ., is there any 
moral correspondence here between the goodness 
voiu?ta7y. als ° of the Supreme and the goodness of the finite 
responsible agent ? In this, as in all analysis, we 
must proceed from facts near and easily known to those which 
are more remote — from the yviopifia rtfuv to the yvtupLjia cnrXCjg. 
In examining our own voluntary action we found (§ 16) 
that the interior essentiality or power of any being is not a 
hindrance to the fact that he may act freely ac- 
termination de * cording to his own nature. The freedom which is 
voiu S ntaS der essen ti a l 1° goodness is only interfered with when 
there is external compulsion. But this is inconceiv- 
able in the case of Him who is Supreme. Therefore His good- 
ness is voluntary in act, though His nature is necessarily good. 
The conclusion is not to be avoided. 
We may even, with all reverence, add, in reference to the 
Supreme, what we said of the finite conscious agent, that the 
doer of any act has himself placed a limit, so that, as the old 
poet says, 
[xovov yap avrov Kai Stog arepiaKeTai 
i. 2.) ayevyra tt otelv aaa' dv y Tmrpaypkva. — Agatho. 
79. But the point now arrived at is far too important to be 
thus passed from. In comparing the Goodness of the finite agent 
with the Goodness of the Supreme we distinguish that which is 
quoad naturam from that which is quoad actum , and 
of the finite we find throughout, what has just been intimated, 
prememarted that the difference lies, fundamentally, in the Fini- 
by tbeFinitude tude which characterizes us. We personallv have 
quoad naturam . n ^ ^ , 
and quoad ac- had a Beginning : goodness, thought, will, action, 
all have had beginning in us. The Supreme, the 
ever-perfect, has ever been, ever thought, ever willed, ever 
acted, quoad naturam suam , even prior to and apart from 
phenomena. Of course it would be impossible to predicate 
of any one act of the Supreme that it “has ever been,” 
if we speak of acts in relation to phenomena — which might be 
