102 
to make the universe eternal, the phenomenal absolute, which 
is a contradiction. 
82. Now the relation of the Supreme to the phenomenal in- 
volves the question of the continuous knowledge and goodness, 
as well as action, of the Supreme. We cannot question that God 
knows, perfectly, the phenomenal world ; aud we know it im- 
perfectly. He knows it as it is ; we aim to know it as it is. 
It has not ever been ; it exists in succession, and God knows 
its phenomena as they are. To say of the true-always that 
“ there is no before or after with God,” may be intelligible : 
but to say of the phenomenal world, that “ there is no before 
or after with God,” is equivalent to saying that the Supreme 
does not know the world as it is. His knowledge of the pheno- 
menal is co-extensive with the phenomenal and possible. Our 
knowledge of it is so limited that, at times, it with difficulty 
reaches even to the probable (§ 29). 
The bearing of this conclusion on any theory of the pre- 
science of the Supreme will depend on our accepting the fact 
of contingency in the phenomenal world. This 
oftMsoS subject also must be deferred to the definitely reli- 
rai contiDgen- g{ ous part of our Analysis. We are here ascer- 
taining principles. To think correctly as to the 
phenomenal, we must, however, here call to mind that con- 
tingency, as we dealt with it, lying among the foundations 
of our responsibility, was not an abstract contingency 
merely, which would amount -to no more than that an action, 
or event, might be conceived a priori as not to happen : but 
what we said had reference to action of conscious agents. The 
contingency spoken of plainly meant that we are previously 
certain, that an act may never de facto come to pass, or that 
it really may come to pass ; and that it is the moral agent 
who ex seipso determines which it shall be, and is respon- 
sible accordingly. 
83. But in examining the relation of the Supreme 
oftheSupreme to the phenomenal in finite action, we must fully 
to the conti- confront this fact of continuousness : for Christian 
nuous. . . J 
Bleatics still deny continuousness to the Supreme, 
to His Being, His Goodness, and His Acts. It is supposed 
in their philosophy, that as continuity implies infirmity in us, 
so we may not attribute it to the Supreme. We must repeat our 
answers. To deny, as they do, continuity to God is to separate 
Him from the phenomenal universe, and affirm that He may 
be an Eternal Conscious Being, in lone relation with the true- 
always, — a Deity inaccessible to man and ignorant of us — 
and therefore not Perfect, i . e. not Supreme — which is a con- 
tradiction. Butin asserting continuity as to the Divine Being, 
