105 
affected by Habit ; and that cannot be with the Supreme, who 
is already Perfect. The finite may advance in goodness to- 
wards the infinite ; and, as our actions flow from our nature, 
the character which we have becomes ultimately modified, and 
finally fixed to a great extent by our own course of action. 
It is evident too that our responsibility is thus thrown, to a 
larger extent, into our own hands for its results. It is only, 
then, of the Supremely Perfect that it could be said that His 
nature is not intensified by His acting. As a fact, however, there 
is less and less of deliberation in the volitions of advancing moral 
agency, whether for good or evil ; and the highest kind of 
finite goodness in action becomes more and more like to “neces- 
sary goodness.” Habitual goodness tends to rise 
towards the Supreme Goodness, being more does not S 
pleasing, and less and less liable to change, in every with 
successive course of existence. The goodness of 
the best conscious agents would seem to begin from deli- 
berating voluntariness, and terminate in perfect habit. 
88. We may be reminded that a finite conscious agent being 
originally good, as nature is good, his continuing in goodness 
might be conceived to result wholly from new gifts of a sus- 
taining kind, not acquired by him, but in some way coming 
to him. But, we reply, his goodness would then be passive, 
and subside to the non-intelligent. For finite moral 
goodness cannot be conceived as wholly inactive. g 00 dneLTan- 
Also the moral agent, having a capacity for action, uot T 30 wholly 
must not decline to go forth into action, since so 
declining he would violate his nature. So then his continuing 
in goodness is his own advance towards the Perfect Good. 
And here, to fix the conclusions arrived at in any one^s 
thoughts, after his reconsidering all the moral foundations of 
the present analysis, it may be well that for himself he should 
ascertain whether (as a believer in goodness') he can „ . 
possibly arrive at any other result r Especially as summary thus 
to this last section of the Analysis, let him settle : — dr ’ 
1 What he means by moral goodness ? 2 Its nature in the 
Supreme, both as to its sameness with, and difference from, 
the finite ? 3 Its beginning in any being ? 4 Its Continuance ? 
5 Its Voluntariness ? and G Habit? 
XIII. 
89. And now once more : — 
We have marked the effect which is produced on the finite 
conscious agent by continuity of action. We find that 
goodness may acquire gradually a higher character in him. 
