108 
93. We have,, thus far, in speaking of habit, regarded it as 
telling on the individual only ; but obviously, in a 
goci e ^ bltsof community of conscious agents, all so constituted, 
the moral agency of every member of the entire 
society would have to be considered in the same light. A 
whole people may indeed acquire a general character by con- 
tinuous mutual action, either of a right or wrong kind. “ What 
is usual” is regarded by inferior agents as practically tbe 
same to them as “ what is right.” When the relation of the 
individual to the true -always has been weakened by personal 
defects, or ill education, or when any baseness, custom and 
fashion tyrannize without check, and are taken as law, 
the whole social condition of a community may thus be so 
lowered that it no longer affords a possible sphere for a justly 
responsible agency. In this case, it seems reasonable to think 
that, under the government of the Supreme Moral Euler, such 
a society would soon be broken up : especially as the habits 
of a community would go on augmenting in fearful proportions. 
In the same way, however, the habits of a highly virtuous 
society would be of increasing value to the individual (§ 156). 
The relation of the individual to a Polity lias already been 
noted (§ 43) ; but the reflex action of the polity on the indi- 
vidual could not be sufficiently considered without inquiring 
as to the sort of polity in which moral agency would best be 
developed for its best ends. 
94. For the fact more and more distinctly stands 
raeter^ to^be out, that the formation of the character of each 
morui d agent? e res V ons ^' G agent is the work ever going on 
in this world. No doubt the man is intended 
to act on his fellow-man ; — but for what end ? So far as 
society is concerned, it might seem sufficient if the man 
satisfied the general requirements of the community, as to 
present and mutual well-doing. The responsibility of each 
member to the whole body, in this respect, is intelligible, and 
adequate. But viewed relatively to the individual himself, 
this will not suffice. He is to himself more than 
nofthTrgAo^ a fragment of a political whole. His ethical con- 
victions are in fact inexplicable to him on a political 
hypothesis only. The perception of this has led some in- 
accurate moralists, like Hartley, to represent self-complacency, 
or approval, as the motive of virtue. But this is shallow. It 
overlooks the fact, that it is a virtue higher than our own 
which our satisfaction aspires to. To say that a man must 
satisfy himself is not to say that he rests in his own merits ; 
but that he shrinks from self-condemnation as a pain. 
95. We are obliged then to contemplate the moral agent 
