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me a guarantee of unquestionable certainty that I know that the phenomena by 
which I am surrounded and myself are two different things, differing toto 
ccelo ; and that I have a voluntary nature which is capable of being an origi- 
nating cause of action, in which it stands related to the Supreme as being 
His distinct image. The Creator, unbounded by conditions, is the originating 
cause of action ; and I am an originating cause of action, bounded by condi- 
tions. I cordially agree with Dr. Irons in the necessity for bringing these 
points to bear upon theology, and I am satisfied that if we get rid of the 
whole class of Eleatic thought from our moral philosophy, we shall be able to 
see our way to get rid of a vast number of differences which harass and 
trouble the Christian Church in the shape of theology. I have given much 
consideration to the subject, but I cannot enter upon it at any length to-night. 
I wish, however, to give my most cordial thanks to Dr. Irons for the way in 
which he has dealt with it, and I would strongly recommend to every one’s 
attention those portions of the paper where he has pointed out distinctly how 
it is that a great deal of what is called modem theology is nothing more nor 
less than a mischievous dishing up of the old Eleatic philosophy, which is 
most injurious to the cause of Christianity. 
Rev. Dr. Irons. — It might assist discussion if I were to suggest that if any 
gentleman has any questions to put to me I shall be most willing to undergo 
cross-examination. There are an immense class of questions dealt with in 
the paper, about which some gentlemen may desire to question me. 
Mr. Reddie. — Allow me to take advantage of that suggestion by making 
a few remarks and asking a few questions with especial reference to that 
part of the paper which Mr. Row has already referred to. Dr. Irons speaks 
of the distinction between the conception of morality in the Supreme and 
in ourselves. He says : — 
“ In Him there is no beginning to be good ; for the Supreme ever exists 
and is ever good. The opposite thought were a contradiction as well as a 
blasphemy.” 
Now I should be glad if Dr. Irons would work that out in some detail. I 
should like him to demonstrate, either in his reply or his next paper, how it 
is that an eternal evil is a contradiction in itself and not conceivable. If that 
were worked out, it would enable Dr. Irons, in summing up, to add to those 
two important deductions at which he arrives, — namely, that universal 
unconsciousness is an absurdity, and that universal nothingness is an 
absurdity, — the further deduction that universal or eternal evil (for the 
word “universal” is used in the sense of “eternal”) is also an absurdity 
and inconceivable. In all these things we have to judge by our reason ; 
and we may arrive at the conclusion rationally, that universal or original 
evil is impossible, just as we may argue that something could not come 
from nothing. And as regards the existence of consciousness, also ; for 
instance : if you can conceive such a condition of the world as an utter 
absence of consciousness and of pre-existing conscious mind, then there could 
have been no such things as conscious beings. Now reasonable beings being 
