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impressed upon nature forces whose province is to execute 
His will. 
But the difficulty of understanding how design can co- 
operate with immutable laws will always exist. Yet why 
should that be any reason for denying it ? We cannot fail 
to recognize it in a watch however imperfectly constructed, 
nor refuse to see it in a flint knife however rudely chipped ; 
why deny it to the Creator, although we may discover in His 
works too innumerable imperfections, to be accounted for, 
however, on quite other grounds ; and which are regarded 
(be it remembered) as a witness to evolution. 
Is there no intention, then, in man^s very existence, even if 
he had been developed from the quadrumana? Is there no 
intention in the adaptation of life to environing circumstances, 
though it may be brought about by law ? Is there no design 
in the senses by which he can receive external impressions, 
though myriads of years may have elapsed in arriving at their 
present condition ; and thousands of transitional forms expe- 
rienced in their development ? Is there no design in the 
mutual adaptations, correspondence, and connection between 
ali his organs ? If all these things and ten thousand others 
are due to chance combinations of laws, if the structure of the 
eye of a vertebrate has been developed from some barely 
sensitive spot of pigment by repeated chance improvements 
which have been beneficial to the creature, in conjunction with 
other changes, in accordance with the principle of the “ corre- 
lation of growth ” ) which principle must be based upon chance 
as well, if not to be allowed as designed ; then, it is clear, the 
chances would be infinity to one, that such variations would 
arise, and that, having arisen, the different organs would vary 
together ; so that by some long series of chance variations 
the eye of a man should have been produced from something 
like the ocellus of an ophiura. 
That the one has probably been developed from the other 
might be admitted, but I must recognize in the development — 
though subjected as it may be to interfering forces — the will 
and intention of the Deity. 
As neither chance nor design admits of strict mathematical 
proof as to its being the cause of structure ; the question 
seems to rest on the basis of probabilities. And if they 
appear to exclude the former, reason and faith alike combine 
to urge the latter. 
But however convinced we may feel that design or mental 
purpose is evidenced by the works of nature, the most casual 
observer cannot fail to recognize chance as an element which 
enters largely into the condition of things. 
