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back and re-examine his facts, with the intimation : “ When you have gone 
through the fiery ordeal which we have gone through, we will listen to you.” 
Mr. Row. — Let me just point out one fact : I think that all are of opinion 
that the logic of induction and of deduction are two essentially different 
principles. Archbishop Whately attempted to resolve them into each other, 
but that was a failure. They are two essentially distinct principles — the 
logic of induction and the logic of deduction. 
The Chairman. — I have only listened to Mr. Garbett’s paper, which is of 
that character that it is quite impossible to discuss it fairly without reading 
it. I must say, therefore, that all the observations which I shall make 
must be taken with this limitation, that I shall not attempt to reply to the 
paper, but only cursorily examine what may have been the false impressions 
which I have received as to the nature of some of the illustrations. With 
the object of the paper I cordially agree ; but there is a little vagueness in 
the manner in which the term “ science ” is used throughout. This is our 
great difficulty, that we find ourselves sliding into five or six different defini- 
tions of science in the same discussion. If we take science in its highest 
and purest sense as meaning true knowledge, which I conceive to be the only 
real and true definition of science, then I would most cordially agree with 
the paper ; but I must go further, and say that I cannot distinguish between 
theology and science, because, in respect of all that is universally true, it will 
be found that theology is of all sciences the highest and purest, and when 
we examine it, it w T ill give us the highest degree of proof of any science 
whatever. I am not afraid that the science of theology, considered strictly 
as a science, and considered strictly as a science arrived at by the opera- 
tion of human reason, should be compared with any other science derived 
from human reason. Take an illustration of Mr. Titcomb’s, though I will 
not go so far as he does. He conceives that it is absolutely demonstrable 
that if you have a right-angled triangle, the square on the side opposite the 
right angle is equal to the squares described on the other sides 
Mr. Titcomb.— I said absolutely true. I said nothing about demonstra- 
tion. 
The Chairman. — Then I misunderstood him. But I would say that the truth 
of the existence of the Deity can be proved by a higher mode of demonstra- 
tion than that arrived at mathematically. The reception of a mathematical 
demonstration as a scientific fact must depend upon its demonstration, and 
that demonstration depends on certain fundamental definitions and certain 
fundamental axioms and postulates. All demonstrations in geometry depend 
on those first principles. If your first principles are open to doubt, all the 
demonstrations founded upon them are equally liable to doubt ; and we find 
that no system of geometry has yet been conceived which has been able to 
proceed upon axioms which are demonstrably true, and admitted to be true 
as a kind of instinctive truth of the human mind. We are obliged in 
some form to assume some propositions which as much require proof as any 
of the propositions afterwards proved. Under these circumstances, I say 
that all geometrical conclusions founded upon geometrical reasoning and de- 
T 2 
