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and perception. He cannot repress a desire and a readiness 
to acquiesce in some one or two propositions at least touching 
things extra- sensual, things high and beyond mortal ken. 
Just as in earlier years we sit by the seaside, and gaze on 
the fantastic forms that rise up from the horizon, till we seem 
almost to wander among the cloud-palaces of dreamland, and 
repose ourselves in the cool shade of some vapoury recess, 
that shows as though it were set in the midst of an ocean of 
rosy light, — so in our later thought-years our minds seem 
irresistibly to float away from earth, and rest in some shadow, 
at least, of the Infinite. Yes, man must believe something ; 
and with many it is a far greater effort to disbelieve than to 
believe, a task of far more difficulty to withhold than to yield 
assent. Some will say that this arises simply from that 
mental indolence which accepts recklessly rather than undergo 
the labour of examination. Others may argue that what was 
formerly said of Nature is really true of mind, that it abhors 
a vacuum, and had rather fill itself with the untrue than not 
be filled at all. However we may choose to account for the 
fact, it still remains the same ; the would-be unbeliever cannot 
disbelieve : he cannot cut himself off from the whole region of 
the Unseen : he must assent to something. 
Hence the Credulity of Scepticism. 
Let us examine carefully what these two words mean. It is 
an evident truth, which is nevertheless well worth repeating, 
that four-fifths of our disagreements in science and philosophy, 
and nine-tenths of those in religion, arise from carelessness 
and want of precision in the use of words. Controversy shel- 
ters itself and grows gigantic behind the mists that rise from 
equivocal and undefined terms. 
1st. What is Scepticism ? 
Etymologically it signifies “a habit of examining.” In 
itself this habit would be the reverse of injurious; a sound 
and enlightened scepticism would appear to be the only means 
of solid advance in philosophy, and a defence of, rather than 
an offence to, Religion. We know that the scepticism of Hume 
did overthrow, in this country, the old Aristotelian dogmatism, 
and led to a philosophy based on sounder principles, — that of 
Reid. Such was perhaps the first meaning of the name as 
applied to and accepted by early philosophers, who dared 
to doubt and examine where doubt was reckoned a treason : 
Nullius addicti jurare in verba magistri. 
But there arose sceptics in philosophy subsequently specially 
known by that name, who carried their doubting and exami- 
nation farther than this salutary process of testing again the 
