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Book, or series of books, for which alone is made the claim 
that it is such a communication. There is no need to en- 
deavour to fix the origin of this religious scepticism. From 
the very first appearance of the very first portion of this Book 
there must have been, and we know there were, sceptics, of the 
school of Jannes and Jambres. And as time went on, and 
yet more parts of the Book appeared, and were held as further 
utterances, in grander and clearer tones, of the voice of the 
All-wise, sceptics must have multiplied and did multiply. But 
we have not here to do with those of old, who having breathed 
the atmosphere without, thick with the mists of error and the 
night of human ignorance, could not bear the purer breezes 
that emanated from the (Treat Teacher's finished work. We 
are concerned with those who in our own time have fancied 
they have found reason for rejecting as untrue what others hold 
to be God's Revelation to mankind. 
There is another word in the title to be defined. What is 
Credulity ? 
Etymologically, the diminutive termination of the word 
credit his would lead us to imagine that some slight insin- 
uation of contempt was intended in every case where it was 
employed. And this appears to be the fact. The credulous 
is not one who believes only, but who believes where he might 
be expected to disbelieve; where the majority of thinking 
people do not believe ; and where the belief is itself no proof 
of the fulness of his reasoning powers. And thus we get to 
the true notion of credulity. The credulous person, as con- 
trasted with the rational believer, is one who yields assent upon 
grounds which are not adequate to produce rational belief. 
Belief is properly defined to be the assent to a proposition 
as proved by testimony. It is a species of opinion. Opinion 
being the assent to a probable proposition, as such, Belief is 
the opinion which assents to a probable proposition proved by 
that special kind of probable premiss which we call authority, 
or testimony. Now, as Bishop Butler clearly shows, it is 
almost always a man's duty to act upon opinion or belief. In 
fact, if we waited for knowledge founded upon demonstration 
before we acted, we should in most cases not be able to act at 
all. But (to use the bishop's own words) u probable evidence 
is distinguished from demonstrative in this, that it admits of 
degrees." To ignore these degrees, and fancy one probability 
as good as another, is to fall into the fault which, when 
committed in the matter of evidence or testimony , we call 
ee credulity." This word then signifies the habit of assenting 
to propositions proved by weak or insufficient testimony ; to 
propositions a priori improbable, of which the improbability is 
