340 
penses with Theology, and with Christianity also as a passing 
phase in human affairs, M. Comte with equal unreason, would 
introduce, as if distinct agents, Order,” “ Force,” “ Depen- 
dence,” and so on ; — terms intelligible enough, of course, as 
expressing human conceptions, but wholly unproved as distinct 
entities ; indeed so unintelligible, as such, that they absolutely 
vanish, when we attempt to translate them into the language 
of common sense. 
108. We would bring M. Comtek, or any ambitious philo- 
sophy to the test by this ; let it construe its abstractions into 
realities; for abstractions are not agents, (whatever be our 
convenient way of speaking,) until this can be done. (§ 21.) 
Comteism cannot bear this test. Here it shrinks from facts. 
Beginnings ^ aims to supply the raison d’etre of whatever is, 
accounted T'r an( ^ denies Causation ; and takes refuge in 
in M. Comte’s “Order,” just as a more manageable abstraction; 
philosophy. — Causation implying a special kind of antece- 
dence, which Order does not. 
But this will not bear looking into. M. Comte has not 
even his abstractions ready, to account for the beginnings of 
motion , either in the physical world or in the intellectual. 
Yet it is a fact co-extensive with human nature everywhere, 
that a beginning of any motion suggests to all men a prior 
agent. “ The wind bloweth where it listeth,” is a felt state- 
ment, for example, of a beginning of motion, unaccountable 
to man, but of which there mast be some account. Indeed 
he cannot otherwise explain how every investiga- 
cohisioif 1 S with tion of science invariably takes the direction of 
behfg ° f ° ur causation : it could not proceed a moment in the 
contrary way. How then can inquiry into any action 
be intelligible, except on this same latent assumption of 
causation ? Say you, it is “ Order ” that is enquired for ? 
But why ? Why call any condition Disorder ? If facts oblige, 
you, then you own Causation. — Comteism, again then, appears 
to be a simple denial of facts. 
109. Yet in denying Causation, M. Comte is more far-seeing 
(in so far as his system is concerned) than some of the more 
logical reas oners who have opposed his views among non- 
Christians : for it is impossible to admit Causation as they do, 
English Po . without ultimately going on to Religion. Hence it 
eitiyism more is, that we may be calm as to the future of much of 
English Positivism. It is too moral to deny Causa- 
tion ; and too closely observant of facts to content itself with 
M. Comte's analysis. In logical consistency it must advance 
towards the point where it must meet the challenge of Chris- 
tianity ; and we are quite content to say, let the truth have its 
