342 
not perhaps have been disputed, had it not unhappily been 
represented by such uncouth negative terms as the “ uncon- 
ditioned,” and the “ unthinkable,”&c. Mr. Herbert Spenser has 
conclusively pointed out, that (C in the very assertion that all our 
knowledge properly so called is relative, there is involved the 
assertion that there exists a non-relative ” ; and again, “ an 
ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our 
intelligence”: and once more, “ Besides that Definite con- 
sciousness of which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an 
indefinite consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides 
complete thoughts, and thoughts which though incomplete 
admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible 
to complete, and yet which are still real in the sense that they 
are normal affections of the intellect.” (See § 29.) 
113. These suggestions must here suffice : we must not 
diverge from our main task. It is enough that a relation to 
that true-always which is no negation, (for it is essential to 
conscious agency,) we have seen to be also essential to the 
Supreme Ruler ; and only because His Character is in perfect 
relation to the true-always, are we able to trust and reverence 
Him. — Indirectly, too, we may thus perceive how the popular 
difficulty is exposed, which represents the Supreme as external 
to the Universe, and therefore unknown. We only think of 
the Supreme as external to the phenomenal, or finite ; not to 
the true-always. 
Here we may be justified for the present, in taking leave of 
the Comteist. If he be of the party which would construct a 
religion without a God, we point to the facts of human nature 
as irreconcileable with his view, and evincing that to be 
without God, is, as man feels, to be without hope in the 
The deter- world.” This is the superhuman, supernatural 
mmation ^ of element in all Religions. If we are dealing with 
against Comte- the class of Positivists who discard even Comte's 
ists. ( c Religion of Humanity,” as unproved if not irra- 
tional, we must again remind them, that the facts are all 
against their unintelligible notion of virtue without freedom, 
— Responsibility without Causation, — goodness without Will 
and without conscious relation with the true-always. 
We may now pass, to complete, as we believe on the unas- 
sailable foundations of fact, our argument for individual 
Religious Responsibility. — It arises in connexion with our 
relations to the Supreme : we have previously shown that 
there are such relations : and we have further found that reli- 
gion can have no a priori denial. 
