366 
desired to throw doubt on other methods of advancing to the 
same questions as are here treated ; but we have given pre- 
cedence, (with Coleridge, and Kant, and the best of the 
moderns,) to the Deontological, as more certain and clear, 
and setting practical limits to all later speculation. Our 
assumptions at the outset were such as not only to need no 
artificial definition, but to admit no denial, if men are to think 
in any way on the subjects proposed. Our first step, like that 
of science, ought to be such as could not be disputed, and to 
be an appeal to consciousness, and fact, and not a deduction 
from premisses. It is only when some such first step is taken, 
that men are in the sphere of critical reason. 
170. The first step, for instance, ^in the usual a priori Argu- 
ment of Theology is the assumption of the idea of Causation. 
The first step of the a posteriori argument is the idea of 
Design, — both of them the battle-grounds of objectors. The 
first step of the Metaphysical reasoners is the assumption 
of certain Ontological ideas. The first step of some sectarian 
theologies is the assumption of the idea of Creation. Our 
beginning is easier, for it has, we repeat, the advantage of 
being unquestionable, by those who mean to reason at all. 
171. But if, at our present position, it is thus incumbent on 
the believer of any form of Revelation to see that he accepts 
nothing in discordance with previous facts of his responsi- 
bility, there will be an appeal to his consciousness throughout, 
which he cannot morally ignore. His Christianity, whatever 
it be, must not contravene the true-always. Nor may it, 
in the sphere of the phenomenal, forget the limitations and 
relations of the finite. 
172. If, with St. Paul, any one is ready to admit as vital to 
his Christianity, the doctrine and fact of the Resurrection ; 
if, with St. John, he founds his faith on the Incarnation ; 
if, with the Church of later times, the historic Creeds are 
deemed to be essential, he takes these positions because 
they are compatible with the whole Philosophy of Duty, — the 
reverent acknowledgment of the true-always and the relation 
to it of the phenomenal. He must think, e. g. that there 
may be a Philosophy of the Resurrection, simply assuring the 
needful identity of the individual moral agent, throughout 
all phenomenal changes ; a Philosophy of the Incarnation, 
loftily vindicating the required relation of the finite to the 
true-always ; a Philosophy of Providence, as the ultimate 
and indispensable solution of moral difficulties ; a Philosophy 
of Worship, as the habitual recognition by the individual of 
the true-always ; and of Prayer as the expression of a moral 
relation to the phenomenal also; and of Praise as the re- 
