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with the argument from reason which I had put forward. But if he thinks so, 
he denies man’s responsibility so far as man is a fallen being. For my own 
part, I cannot admit that the fall makes the least difference in this question. I 
have not entered upon any technical theology in my argument. I have simply 
addressed it to the natural reason of human beings. If a man tells me I 
am a fallen being, he is saying no more than that I am not so perfect as I 
might be ; but that does not exonerate me from the grave duty of using my 
powers to the best. I must do it, otherwise I feel that I have a sense of 
guilt— that I have not done what I ought to have done. In human beings 
there are the greatest diversities of powers and circumstances, and one 
chapter in my paper is devoted to these diversities. But after all, respon- 
sibility holds on, notwithstanding that diversity ; and I think that any one 
who considers what I have said, and compares it with the facts of human 
nature, will agree with me that the doctrine of a universal fall does not alter 
the case any more than the fact of the great diversities of moral power in 
individuals. The one question with which my Paper opens — the only 
assumption I make is, that here we are, and that somehow or other everybody 
holds himself more or less responsible, and to some extent the subject of 
praise and blame, even to his fellow-man, as Mr. Holyoake himself puts it. 
But that is not all. I have taken that very position of Mr. Holyoake’s as to 
man being responsible to his fellow-man. That is one of the facts I began 
with, and which we cannot escape from. We could not get on by denying a 
fact like that. No man could succeed in business ; you would not trust a 
servant if he entirely denied his responsibility and his accountability to you 
and to every one else. A man who acted on that hypothesis could not be 
trusted. All I insist upon is a fact of human nature, that every one does 
hold everybody else’s accountability, more or less, within certain limits ; and I 
make every allowance for great diversities, even in responsibility 
Mr. Reddie. — But that accountability presumes the freedom of will which 
Mr. Holyoake denies. You clearly and properly admit this in §§ 123, 124. 
Dr. Irons. — But I do not unfairly assume freedom : Mr. Holyoake will 
see that. I would ask any one to go through the paper carefully, and point 
out where any unfair assumptions are. It is either a gross imposture that 
has deluded my mind for seventeen years, or else it is so absolutely true that 
you might just as truly put Q. E. D. at the end of it as at the end of the first 
proposition in Euclid. If I have been in error, expose it, and I will thank 
you, because you will have shown me my delusion, and you are my friend. 
But if it be true, I am your friend. I have now only to thank you very 
much for the kind patience you have extended to me. 
Rev. C. A. Row. — I think Dr. Rigg asserted that Dr. Irons had assumed 
the principle of causation. I think, however, that he has made a mistake 
there, for I read all these papers with the greatest care, and I have not come 
to that conclusion, but the contrary. But I did come to the conclusion that 
he assumed responsibility as a fact, on the testimony of my own mind, and 
the universal testimony contained in language as the voice of universal man. 
Dr. Irons. — You are entirely right. I have already stated that I assumed 
