62 
is the tendency in such persons to represent the objects of 
faith, and the truths which we may be said to know, as 
mU 38 1 “it seem^to^e'that these and kindred distinctions are 
pureiy arbitrary, and point to no one fact m 
constitution. A searching analysis will prove ^that faith m 
the final act of all our mental processes, of which the searcn 
after truth is the object. Such a search must terminate in a 
conviction, and I am unable to understand m what it diffeis 
from an act of faith. In some cases we call the act a conviction 
and in others faith, according to the subject matter , but t 
makes no real difference in the mental states themselves 
Faith also, or conviction, accompanies every act of the mind 
by which it yields assent to our intuitions. It is the act ot 
recognizing them as true, and forms the ground on which we 
concfude that they are realities, whether they be mtnHions 
nurelv intellectual, intuitions connected with our moral 
nature or those which lead us to trust m the perceptions 
of the senses as true, or the objects of the P^on® as 
desirable. Again, in all questions in which reason is i - 
volved, the final act is a conviction of ?r behef in the 
truth of the conclusion. This conviction is faith. It may 
varv through every degree of intensity ; but it is founded 
on y our reason. The subject matter on which it operates 
may be either demonstrative or contingent, but still a con- 
viction is the result. If we are dealing with ““ale^dence 
the force of it may approximate to the certainty ot pu 
demonstration, or aLZt only to a low probability, and the 
strength of the conviction will vary accordingly. Ot tins 
kind are all those beliefs which are dependent on testamony_; 
but the processes through which we arrive at them 
foundation in our reason, and therefore it is absurd to t lk 
of an opposition between the conclusions of reason l and ot 
faith Our belief in testimony rests on grounds which are 
pureiy rational, and every step of the process must be tested 
by reason. Faith has been often spoken of, as if it were 
identical with trust, and as such opposed to reason. Tru t 
however, is a conviction only differing from others m the 
nature of the subject matter. , W % trust ’, beC “ S %7 tll t we 
that the object of trust is worthy of confidence. To 
can only attain by rational processes. If our trust is foi mde 
on anything opposed to these, such as prejudice, and anything 
which will not endure a rational inquiry, it is a mere cha 
Tit is not entirely misplaced. Unless a man is prepared to 
assert that his belief or trust is founded on a direct inspira- 
tion the basis on which it is founded must be either a rational 
