63 
one or simple prejudice. It follow s, therefore, that whenever 
the mind is in a state of active inquiry after truth, its various 
processes end in a common result, — a conviction, or belief. 
39. Faith and knowledge have been often contrasted as 
mental acts. As far as I am aware, such contrast is nowhere 
made in the New Testament ; nor can I see that it is con- 
sistent with any principle of sound philosophy. The former 
is a term of wider extent than the latter ; but can it be said 
that an act of faith does not accompany every act of know- 
ledge ? Our intuitions are all subjects of knowledge, and all 
strict deductions from pure axioms are of the same character. 
Can it be said that we do not exercise faith or belief in our 
intuitive perceptions ? I have the firmest belief that the whole 
is greater than its part. The processes by which I arrive at 
the conviction that Charlemagne once existed, and that some 
of the actions ascribed to him are facts, and others myths, are 
very different from mathematical deductions ; but they may be 
quite as powerful to produce conviction. They are essentially 
rational and rest ultimately on principles, which are more or 
less of the nature of intuitions. The only valid distinction is 
not in the rational character of the process, but in the subject 
matter. It follows, therefore, that conviction is the final 
result of the whole of our mental processes which are in- 
volved in the search after truth ; the term faith is more usually 
restricted to those convictions which have a decided bearing 
on our moral and spiritual being. The same line of reasoning 
will prove that there is no such distinction between those 
beliefs which we accept on testimony, and our other convic- 
tions, as to render it necessary that we should refer them to a 
distinct class of mental phenomena. When we believe in 
testimony, we believe because we think that it is supported 
by adequate evidence ; that the person on whose testimony we 
rely is veracious, and that he possesses ample means of in- 
formation. Our judgment may be bad, but this is a defect 
which may be common to every rational act. Here, however, 
it is necessary to keep carefully before us the distinction 
between unintelligible propositions and truths lying beyond 
the reach of our faculties to establish. Inattention to this 
distinction has been a fruitful source of error. It is a mere 
delusion to think that we believe in the former ; all that we 
can do is to say that we assent to them. But a belief in the 
latter, if sufficiently attested, is highly rational. It may be 
beyond the reach of our powers, e. g., to demonstrate the truth 
of a future state. But it is an act in the highest degree rational, 
to believe it on the testimony of one who must know the truth 
respecting it, i. e. 3 God. 
