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constant probing of them is not only a symptom of disease, 
but a means of aggravating it. Nothing is more subversive 
of profound moral convictions, than to be constantly dealing 
with cases of casuistry. 
67. A perception of freedom is inseparable from all healthy 
moral action. Its true idea is self-sacrifice under a profound 
sense of obligation. Hence it follows that the only sound con- 
dition of moral feeling is when, under the influence of certain 
great principles of obligation implanted in the conscience, 
man becomes a law to himself. But the existence of a moral 
code implies that obligation is contemplated as a mere objective 
rule, and assumes the form of bare legality, an aspect of moral 
obligation which stands in distinct opposition to it as a spon- 
taneous act of self-sacrifice. The moment we view obligation 
as mere hard, definite law, imposed on us by an external 
power, we convert it from a law of freedom into one of 
slavery. 
68. It follows that a moral law of an elevated character can 
never be specific in its precepts, or attempt to embrace the 
whole round of duty. It need not have any specific precepts 
at all. When it has them, it can only employ them as illustra- 
tions of great principles. Thus they are useful as showing the 
mode in which general principles should be worked out in 
practice. But a precept being only part of a great objective 
rule of action, if it stands by itself, and is without reference to 
the remainder, it is not only incomplete, but very frequently 
misleading. In all cases it is impossible to get an accurate 
view of a great system, of which the parts are mutually 
dependent, without the ability to take a view of it as a com- 
plicated whole. A moral law which is suited for a free 
agent must content itself with dealing with great principles 
and entrust the working out of details to the healthy action of 
the mind, in conformity with the ever-varying character of 
circumstances, which affect the moral character of particular 
acts. 
69. These considerations effectually dispose of objections 
against Christianity on the ground of alleged omissions of 
certain duties in her moral teaching. I fully admit the fact 
that she does not attempt to evolve a moral code, or even a 
complete system of ethical doctrine. Her omission to do so 
is her greatest glory. If she had attempted it, she would 
have stood self- condemned before the tribunal of philosophy. 
I think that it is true that she does not even attempt to 
evolve a moral precept in the form of an objective law. Her 
morality is purely the morality of the spirit, and not of the 
letter. * Her principles are all-embracing, not so her precepts. 
