97 
and — I must use the word — not true. Mr. Eow says, for instance : — 
“ Without conviction all action is impossible ; ” but in his account of temp- 
tation there was one little word which throws a light on the whole of the 
maze into which he has brought himself by using too strong terms, and not 
balancing the pros and cons of the case. He alluded to the ancient philoso- 
phers, and to the declarations of Plato and Aristotle, that it was impossible 
to do wrong except by acting contrary to the dictates of reason and know- 
ledge. But that is recognized, so far as it is true, in Christianity, and 
throughout the Scriptures ; for there people are said to speak wrongly and to 
do evil “ because of the ignorance that is in them,” while it is taught that true 
knowledge would enlighten and guide them. But Mr. Eow says, in the case 
of the drunkard, that he has to get rid of his convictions altogether — he 
has to extinguish them ! Now the real state of the case is, that the convic- 
tions are not destroyed — they only “ become latent,” as Mr. Eow, in the one 
passage I have referred to, truly states. And in the case of the drunkard, the 
man will tell you that while he takes the glass in his hand, he knows and feels 
that his act is contrary to his own convictions of what he ought to do 
Mr. Eow. — I may explain that all that part of my paper is merely an 
analysis of the seventh book of Aristotle’s Ethics. 
Mr. Eeddie. — I venture to question Mr. Eow’s agreement with Aristotle ; 
especially as we have a statement in another passage of the paper as to the 
unpractical character of all ancient philosophy. Now Aristotle begins his 
Ethics by telling us that his treatise is entirely practical ; and I cannot 
conceive that any one can read it without thinking it entirely practical in its 
whole aim and object. Epictetus and Seneca are also eminently practical ; 
and I must say that I join issue with Mr. Eow most thoroughly on that 
point ; and I wish to have this placed on record, because neither Mill nor 
Lecky, nor any of our opponents with whom Mr. Eow joins issue — and, as a 
rule, so manfully and ably — will agree with him here. I do not wish to 
depreciate the consideration due to Mr. Eow’s paper ; but it is only right 
that we should state our opinions openly and fairly ; and that no paper con- 
taining erroneous opinions or reasoning should go out from the Institute 
without some contradiction being also placed on record. There are some 
other parts in the paper which I think were not necessary for Mr. Eow’s work- 
ing out his main thesis, and which would have been better left out ; and it is 
on these parts that I feel obliged to speak ; but I think that in some of them 
Mr. Eow is contradictory to himself. I do not think he gives a fair account 
of the ancient moralists when he says that their only principle of moral 
improvement was habit. No doubt, the importance of habit is dwelt upon by 
Aristotle, and, indeed, no moralist could fail to see its great importance. 
But I cannot understand Mr. Eow’s way of putting it. He talks as if the 
principle of habituation were the only principle of moral improvement among 
the ancients. He says 
“ The only mighty influence with which philosophy was acquainted, -which 
was capable of effecting improvements in the moral and spiritual condition of 
mankind, was, as I have said, that of habituation.” 
VOL. Y. H 
