160 
which are constantly ruhbed off the surface of the skin to possess mdmdual 
vitality. They are particles which have served their purpose and are thrown 
off, but are no more living individuals because they move about, than woul 
be hits of hair or any other perfectly effete portion of the animal frame 
Mr. Reddie.— Then their movement is mechanical . 
Mr Brooke.— That I am not prepared to say, hut it does exist, 
movement does exist, and it is mechanical certainly ; but whence the motion 
is derived and what are the causes of ciliary motion, I do not take upon 
myteS to define. I can only point to the fact that we cannot take self-move- 
ment of itself as an evidence of life or individual vitality. 
Mr REDDIE.-But you do not take Professor Kirks own qualification of 
the definition. He says, not that all movement is life, but only that where 
there is life there must be self-movement. 
Professor Kirk.-I do not say that all movement is life, but that all sef 
Mr. Brooke.— But I say that we must not go to movement as an erld ™“ 
of the existence of life. In the 18th paragraph of the paper Professor K 
says : — 
“ Our inner consciousness is as real as oureyesight In that ^cmusness 
there is a distinction made, whetherwe to exam^/wll a" usual to lift 
and our material movements. He who, tor exampi , 
his arm or to move his tongue, and finds he pr ° 
distinction. The will is left, but the muscular capacity go . 
Now I must take exception to that as a matter of fact - Pn 
paralysis, where the power of moving the tongue, for example “ £ 
lost it does not follow that the muscular capacity is gone-it is only that the 
medium of communication between the mind and the muscle is d = d 
„„d volition is no longer transmitted to the muscle. The directing 
fl elee nf the brain is no louver transmitted ; but it does not therefore 
should btaluU- ">• .Mohl. no. slnod, «o.»K. Tbou ,n 4. 
20th paragraph Professor Kirk says : , „ 
« You may call that which has the capacity of self-movement mind. 
Now I do not think you can apply that term to the capacity of 
ment. I would rather define mind to be the power of combining ideas. I 
think the best definition of mind that can be given is simply that of the 
power of comparing and associating ideas ; and we cannot ^ 
l mind .. exactly in the way that Professor Kirk here suggests. I take the 
liberty of making these one or two observations as not at all interfering w i 
the general scope and argument of the paper, but , M pomtog °at^ « 
m ,tfers of inaccuracy which it would be desirable to modify. So far, how 
" 1 general Conclusions of the paper go, I am most happy to give my 
