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in other words, to string axiom to axiom till we pass from truth 
which is both self-evident and necessary, to truth which is 
necessary, but not self-evident. 
5. For example, that any two sides of a triangle are together 
greater than the third side, is a necessary truth, but not a 
self-evident one; but it is reached by such self-evident truths 
as these, "that the whole is greater than its part,” "that if 
equals be added to equals, the wholes are equals,” &c. In the 
same manner the necessary truth that Deity exists is reached 
by a series of self-evident truths, or axioms. If this process be 
called demonstration when applied to the relations of space, it 
must equally be called demonstration when applied to any 
other series of relations, and must carry with it as much cer- 
tainty in the one case as in the other. 
6. The first axiom that need be stated in this demonstration 
is, that every change in an unconscious object must be involuntary 
and unknown. It is self-evident that to will is impossible 
without being conscious of willing; therefore where there is no 
consciousness there can be no willing. It is also unknown by 
the object; for where consciousness is absent there cannot be 
knowledge. But changes do take place; they are not known 
to, nor willed by, the object in which they occur. But no sane 
man would argue that they happen spontaneously, without 
purpose or reason ; if so, that purpose or reason, not belonging 
to the object, must be distinct from it. Our next axiom there- 
fore is, that every change is caused. The self-evidence in this 
case is said to be imaginary and not real. The irresistible 
conviction presses itself on all men’s minds. This axiom is 
universally allowed to be such, and therefore any conclusions 
based on it are not in any way vitiated by differences regarding 
its origin, but its intuitional character is stoutly denied, and so 
the truth of the conclusions is at stake. Those who take this 
ground say that it is an observation of the uniformity of 
nature, or rather that it is the uniformity itself. Mr. Mill’s 
words are, " The uniformity iu the succession of events, other- 
's 0 called the law of causation.” This seems a very distinct 
confounding of things that differ. If succession be causation, 
then it follows that observing the first you observe the second ; 
but so far from this being the case, I believe that succession 
of itself would not even suggest causation, or even if it were sug- 
gested, it most assuredly would not give that feeling of certainty 
which everywhere accompanies the affirmation of a cause. The 
moment the two words are uttered, we are conscious of a fun- 
damental difference between them, which no reasoning can shake. 
7. Causation and succession are felt to be radically distinct. 
We might easily imagine the present regularity of sequence to 
