173 
be a profitless pursuit.” Leaving the positive philosopher to 
his ignorant negations, we shall resume our profitable pursuit. 
Having demonstrated the existence of the First Cause with His 
consequent attributes, by another demonstration we shall prove 
Him to a be Moral Governor also; perfectly holy, just, and loving. 
15. We affirm then, in the first place, that right exists in the 
belief of men as distinct from wrong. There have been great 
varieties of beliefs in different ages and in different countries 
as to what is right and what is w^rong, but that something is 
right, and something wrong, has been universally held in all 
time. The reason at once unhesitatingly assents to the state- 
ment that it cannot by any possibility be right to do wrong, or 
wrong to do right. 
16. But further, the performance of what we believe to be 
right is, when possible , a duty. Right is absolute in its re- 
quirements. An act is believed to be either right or wrong ; 
if right, then there can be no debate about our duty in the 
matter; if wrong, there can be as little. This is so clearly 
self-evident, that it may be passed without further comment. 
Is it, however, intuitive also ? If the conception of duty as 
distinct from prudence or policy can be originated by society, 
and its obligations enforced, apart from fear of suffering, then 
its derivative character may be maintained ; but if not, we 
must say that it is an intuition. We hold, therefore, that duty 
cannot be originated or imposed by society. 
17. As Professor Bain, of Aberdeen, strongly opposes this, 
it maj^ be permissible to quote a few passages from his w r ork 
on “ Mental and Moral Science,” for the purpose of testing the 
worth of his antagonism. “ Human pursuit, as a whole,” he 
writes, “is divided, for important practical reasons, into two 
great departments. The first embraces the highest and most 
comprehensive regard to self, and is designated Prudence, self- 
love, the search after happiness.” “The second department of 
pursuit comprises the regard to others, and is named Duty. It 
is warred against not only by the forces inimical to prudence, 
but also occasionally by prudence itself.” (Page 393.) On 
page 394 he defines duty to be “ the line chalked out by public 
authority or law, and indicated by penalty or punishment.” He ac- 
knowledges that “ self-love will do little or nothing for improving 
the condition of society ; to the pure self-seeker posterity weighs 
as nothing.” But herein lies a difficulty. We are told that duty, 
or regard to others, is often warred against by regard to self; 
also, that duty is impotent before self-love ; duty, consequently, 
must necessarily be put to one side. Duty may, therefore, be 
left undone and the man still be right, for manifestly it cannot 
be wrong to have the highest regard to self. But while men 
vol. v. o 
