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3. But, I have made these preliminary remarks, with no view 
of taking advantage of the admitted fact, that I have the all but 
universal consent of mankind agreeing with my own convictions 
on this subject. I do not shrink from giving the reasons for 
my belief, any more than I would wish to shrink from giving 
my reasons, had I any, for not believing. When I have an 
opportunity, for instance, I am always glad to tell a Roman 
Catholic why I don’t believe in Papal Infallibility ; l e., to prove 
the negative of the proposition that the Pope is infallible, just 
as readily as I always am to tell an infidel why I do believe the 
Christianity of the Bible ; and to-night I am ready to give my 
reasons for believing that the world is the creation of an 
Intelligent First Cause, i.e. God; or, to prove the negative of 
the proposition that we ourselves, and what we see around us, 
are all the work or production of chance or unintelligent neces- 
sity, i. e., of no directing mind or supreme intelligence. 
4. In the discussion to which I have already referred, and 
the unsatisfactory result of which induced me to come forward 
to deliver this lecture, Mr. N , on being asked what proof 
would satisfy him that God does exist, placed his hand upon 
the tumbler on the table before him and said, “A proof like 
what I have for the existence of this glass, which I can see and 
touch.” The reply he received to this was painfully inadequate ; 
and I shall now, therefore, give my answer to this demand. 
Could you, I would ask, convince a blind man that colour is as 
real a thing as sound? or a deaf man that sound is as real and 
sensible as the things he sees and handles ? Could you convince 
any man that he does not feel pain because he cannot see it? 
Or, do you believe that a dead man is alive, because you see 
the material body as it lies organized before you, only wanting 
the invisible part, the life, which cannot be seen ? How, then, 
can it be reasonable, — and this is a question of reason, — to ask 
the same proof for the existence of two things, which, in their 
nature, are utterly different ? And this leads me, to what 
ought to be the real beginning of the question, namely, to the 
definition of what we mean by God ; for, it is only if I define 
God to be something material or sensible, that I can reasonably 
be asked for such a proof of His existence as would be required 
of me in order to prove the existence of a material or sensible 
object.. But I think it pretty well known that in England the 
Deity is not believed to be a stock or stone which can be 
touched or handled. And, while I wish to show you how 
unreasonable it is — how almost like trifling with the question — 
to ask for the same proofs of God’s existence, as you have for 
the existence of what you can see and touch ; and while I am 
bound also to say, in justice to Mr. N , that he afterwards 
added, that “ much less proof” would satisfy him ; I hope to be 
