189 
owe the stability of the earth, and the regular appropriation, 
in their several places of earth, water and air on this globe ; 
here again we are forced to rise to the appreciation of the 
manifest truth, that this unseen, all pervading influence is 
applied upon principle, in regular order, under law, and not 
by chance ; that the will of God, as our own, in fine, is deter- 
mined by intelligence . 
8. And now, that the subject has led me to refer to one of 
the most simple material objects, I will make a few observations 
respecting the existence of what is called, abstractedly, Matter. 
Mr. W— correctly stated that the existence of matter itself had 
been denied by some, and instanced Bishop Berkeley as one who 
notoriously did so. This, however, was questioned by Mr. N , 
who said he did not believe that Berkeley meant to deny the 
existence of matter at all. But these contradictory opinions 
might have been prevented b y a definition ; for we shall see 
that it is quite possible that both parties may have been right, 
according to their own sense of what they were talking about. 
If by matter was meant all sensible objects we can see and feel 
around us, certainly Berkeley never denied that these things do 
exist, sensibly as they appear to do, and precisely as we see and 
feel them. But if by matter is meant some general material foun- 
dation or substratum in the objects, besides what we see and feel, 
any substance (that which stands under these sensible forms), 
such as the Aristotelians believed in,— and that this substance is 
an eternal matter, or materia prima, common to all material things, 
while the sensible things we do see and perceive, are but the 
forms or accidents which, as it were, cover and clothe this sup- 
posed substratum of matter, this Berkeley did deny; and, when we 
clear the ground a little, and explain what we mean thoroughly, 
I doubt whether any one in this room will venture to profess 
he believes that there is any such matter or substance in exist- 
ence.* Indeed, I think it would be useless to argue with a 
man who denied the existence of what was visible and tangible 
before him ; but, though I must not diverge into an examina- 
tion of the great argument as to our mental perceptions, pro- 
* That I am right in this representation of Bishop Berkeley’s views, will 
best be seen by the following paragraph from Part I., § 35 of his Principles 
of Human Knowledge. He writes : — “ I do not argue against the existence 
of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That 
the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really 
exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we 
deny is that which philosophers sail matter , or corporeal substance. And in 
doing this [he not unwittily adds] there is no damage done to the rest of 
mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it.” — (Wright’s ed., vol. i. n 99 ) 
VOL. y. P r *■' 
