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final causes must be a profitless pursuit.” It must be, because it is impos- 
sible for the human mind to imagine a beginning, or to define an unorganized 
Being. According to your argument, why may I not be justified in saying 
that Nature is eternal, that we know of nothing excepting Nature, and if 
Nature existed before the Being, what necessity was there for the Being ? If 
you say that He is eternal and uncreated, why may not Nature be equally 
so ? Your argument would show that it is impossible to imagine the non- 
existence of a Deity. I say that it is much easier to imagine the non-exist- 
ence of some strange, extraordinary Being, of whom no one has any know- 
ledge, than to imagine the non-existence of Nature ; you cannot imagine the 
non-existence of everything. All these discussions must end where they 
begin— in assumption. No one has any knowledge of the subject ; it is 
pure imagination, according to each one’s intellect, mode of thought, and 
training. If you limited yourselves to stating your imaginations as imagina- 
tions, I should have no contention with you ; but when you come forward 
to say, We can demonstrate such a Being, He has certain attributes, and 
He designed us for certain purposes, and we must therefore pursue a certain 
line of conduct (which you lay down), I must differ from you, for you have 
no more knowledge than I have, and you have no right to lay down rules for 
my guidance. I have gone over two or three points, and I trust to pay 
still more attention to the argument. I intend publishing thoughts upon this 
subject ; they will be more coherent than the imperfect utterances of to-night, 
and I shall take an early opportunity of laying them before Dr. M‘Cann. 
The Rev. C. A. Row. — I came here this evening to do what was rather 
disagreeable,— to severely criticise, with the intention of demolishing, Dr. 
M‘Oann’s paper ; and it did not require the aid of Mr. Holyoake for that 
purpose. I candidly confess, however, that I further intended to supplement 
that paper ; but my friend Mr. Reddie has produced something which has 
rendered that unnecessary. First of all, let me say that Mr. Holyoake has 
made a slight mistake respecting paragraph 13 ; he has misunderstood or 
misapprehended it. I have certainly not read it as intending to assert that 
there is no such thing as a First Cause. It is a mere inference, following 
certain principles which the author disclaims. I do not say that the points 
in the paper have been put as clearly as they might be, and in some places 
I think there have been misprints. For instance, in page 2 the author says 
“by demonstration is meant induction and I think he means “deduction.’’ 
Dr. M‘Cann. — Yes. 
Mr. Row.— So I thought. I am ready to admit that I do not think it 
possible to apply demonstration to the proof of a God in the sense in which 
demonstration is meant in mathematics. In dealing with mathematical sub- 
jects, we deal with two conceptions ; in geometry with simple extension ; and 
in algebra with simple quantity. Dealing with these conceptions only, we are 
able to deduce certain conclusions ; but I do not apprehend that it is possible 
to exercise this strict process in any other department of human know- 
ledge. The moment we introduce another factor into our conception, we are 
incapable of perceiving, for certain, as in mathematics, whether the same 
