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and that many thoughts are quite as certain as a mathematical demonstration 
can be. I would have, myself, no doubt about the existence of a Deity, 
although it could not be demonstrated mathematically. I may mention what 
occurred between Mr. Bradlaugh and myself about the word “ ought.” I 
pressed the meaning of that word upon him, and, in reply, he explained 
it thus : — “ I have an understanding of it, as when I place a piece of paper 
above the flame of a candle to say it ‘ought’ to burn.” Now, I say, no, the 
paper must burn ; if the conditions of burning be absent, the paper cannot 
burn ; there is no “ ought” in the matter at all. As to my apology at the 
beginning, it was rather for the language than for the thought ; and I certainly 
did not quote the passage about a fool with the view of using it as a sneer ; 
w hen I wrote it, I thought of the words in the identical meaning explained 
by the chairman. A fool neither affirms nor denies, the existence of a God ; he 
thinks nothing at all about it ; his thoughts are as one who is “ unwise.” The 
last paragraph in my paper does not apply to Mr. Holyoake, by his own con- 
fession. Mr. Holyoake does not deny the possibility of the existence of a 
God, though he differs about certain definitions that I have given with regard 
to Him. One is, that He is a conscious person — a personality. Now what 
constitutes the personality of man ? The mental divergence between one 
human being and another. One •man’s thoughts, modes of action, motives, 
and characteristics, differ from those of another man, and in them we find 
that which makes up a human being’s personality ; the material, or outward 
form, is not his personality, as such. I use the word far more as regards 
intelligence in man than of him as a material organization. Mr. Holyoake 
acknowledges that when he sees a machine he believes in a framer or con- 
structor, because he has seen machines made by human beings, and a machine 
indicates human intelligence, and that it was made by man. As Mr. Row 
showed us, all that we can do with regard to things that man cannot make is 
to intensify, as it were, what we know of our own power, and of our 
own intelligence. We know our own limits, we know that man can do certain 
things, and that other things he can not do ; yet these other things are done, 
and we call the power that does them the power of the Infinite— that which 
produced creation and all the changes of nature that we see around us. Mr. 
Holyoake says that he intends replying to my address ; may I request him to 
follow my argument as I have stated it, and not to miss certain parts. Only as 
lie does so, will I consider his reply a fair one. In his address he did not touch 
the propositions that I call axioms. In his written reply, I trust that he will 
either acknowledge they are true or show that they are not ; and, if he can do 
so, that they are false not merely as axioms but as propositions. As he pur- 
poses doing that, I will not notice anything further that he has said this 
evening, but will wait for his reply. And if Mr. Holyoake consults his brother, 
he will tell him that I shall not indulge in very objectionable language or harsh 
terms respecting him. Let me, however, make one remark about an obser- 
vation which I had almost overlooked in my introductory paragraph. I 
spoke of those who denied the existence of a Deity altogether. No person 
is more ready or willing than I am to argue with a mere doubter, though I 
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