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gift from the higher mind of God, and the moment a man understands and 
sees design in it, he cannot attribute it to the animal. When a man sees 
that, he ought to see the hand of God in it, but if a man like Mr. Darwin 
for instance does not see this, you must bring some other argument to bear 
upon his mind. My object, then, was simply to meet some arguments 
brought forward in 1852. I omitted one or two points from this paper when 
I read it here on the 7th March, they being points which were more espe- 
cially connected with the discussion which took place in 1852, but I allowed 
them to stand in the print because I could not recast the paper, and because 
they bore on arguments involving the same kind of subterfuges which have 
been brought forward by others when thev have discussed the subjects. 
One of the omitted arguments, however, at the end of the paper, I may 
perhaps be allowed to read now. Several people say now that the main 
scope of our argument has gone a step lower, and that instead of arguing 
from design, we say now that there was at least intention. Many people do 
not know what the phrase “ final causes ” means : many people look upon 
it as meaning immediate cause. Now final cause has nothing to do with 
cause m that sense. It may be a good or a bad phrase, but it means the 
reason of a thing — which is the absolute origin which a thing has had. 
There is much misapprehension about that, and I want to trace out an argu- 
ment to show that there was at least intention— that you could not attribute 
to dead matter itself or to an animal that merely acts under instinct, the 
working of this superior intelligence, but you must fall back upon a superior 
and intelligent being— and I think that argument may reach the minds of 
men who are blind enough not to see design in nature, or who will not admit 
that they see it, whether they are blind to it or not. I will merely add that 
the only argument brought forward against the paper in the discussion which 
took place upon it in June 1852, was what I may call the mere chop- 
logic argument of Mr. Holyoake-not Mr. Austin Holyoake, but his better- 
known brother— that if a watch requires a watchmaker and a man requires 
a man-maker, then God requires a god-maker. That is an argument which 
cannot be hushed in this way. No doubt we require a maker for a watch ; 
we know that its various wheels are put together by a man, and we know 
that mere matter itself could not do that by accident. No fortuitous con- 
course of atoms such as Lucretius talked of could do it ; and if the argument 
is that no fortuitous concourse of atoms could put man together, thenwe see 
the necessity for a preceding power that could make man. But to go on 
and say that that preceding power would also require a maker, is to argue 
from mere words or sounds, and not from seijse. (Hear, hear.) That was 
the real issue of the argument then, and I should not have mentioned it at 
all if I had not expected Mr. Holyoake or Mr. Bradlaugh to be here to-night, 
because, if the argument is not given up by them, I should have expected 
them to come forward and maintain it. I mention it now in order that they 
may expose the fallacy of my position, if they wish to do so. 
Mr. Row.— I feel under some difficulty in continuing this discussion, 
because when the subject was last before us I spoke upon it, and I shal 
