214 
be in great danger of dividing my remarks into two portions each of 
which will look incomplete in our printed report, and the result will be that 
my argument cannot fail to lose something of its force and character. . Now, 
as to the desirableness of our discussing a subject of this kind, it is very 
obvious that we do want to have a thorough discussion of the great principle 
which is now so openly impugned by a large number of scientific men— that 
is, that you can prove the existence of a designing mind. I have long felt 
and earnestly desired that a paper based on thoroughly philosophical prin- 
ciples should be submitted to us, containing the mere philosophical arguments 
on that point, and I am sure there is nothing in the present state of thought, 
so far as I am acquainted with it, which is more required than that that point 
should be brought to something like a settlement. I own that when I read 
some of these works I am filled with the most profound astonishment ; for I 
cannot understand how it is possible that a rational mind, when it contem- 
plates this subject, can arrive at the conclusion that the marks of intelligence 
in nature, as I must call them for want of a better term, do not prove the 
existence of intelligence as their author. Mr. Reddie has said, in his 6th 
paragraph 
' “ I have no intention in this lecture of enforcing further than I have done 
what is called 4 the argument from design ’ in favour of the Being ol • a.lyotf, 
i.e. the argument that there must have been an intelligent designer ot things 
visible, deduced from the marks of design we can trace m the works ot 
nature around us. The argument is an interesting one, and has been aaini- 
rably treated by Paley and his commentators ; but to some extent it involves 
a petitio principii, a begging of the question, or what is almost tantamount 
to it.” 
Of course in one sense I am willing to admit that it does involve some- 
thing like that, but I do not think we should use the words with that mean- 
ing which is often attached to the phrase 44 marks and indications of 
design in creation.” I do not restrict it to an utilitarian theory of design. 
All I mean is that I see in created things certain powers or objects which 
are apparently adapted to produce certain ends, and without being too mce 
about the words, I would use the term design to mean simply the idea of 
that adaptation of means to ends which I discern in creation. (Hear, hear.) 
That is my general idea of what is. meant by the argument from design. . So 
far I hold it strongly, and it seems to me one of the most marvellous things 
that a man like Darwin should dispute a matter which is so absolutely and 
entirely plain. On a former occasion I entered into this subject at some 
length in answer to Mr. Holyoake, and I do not think it is altogether 
desirable to reproduce exactly the arguments which I then adduced ; but it is 
after all the great moot point of the present day between theists and 
atheists as to whether creation does contain indications of a designing mind. 
I am able to infer, from an ordinary piece of human workmanship, even 
when I do not see the workman, that that work, from the adaptations winch 
it bears, must have been the result of the operation of human skill ; and I 
cannot understand, when I see exactly similar adaptations in nature itself, 
