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loeyond the mere argument which we can adduce from the proofs of a 
designing mind in nature, which is only one portion of the argument for 
theism. °The other portion of the argument is derived from the existence of 
man’s moral nature, and from the existence of himself as a self-conscious 
being. At our last meeting Mr. Bradlaugh uttered some expressions in 
which he fell into metaphysics with regard to the impossibility of provmg 
the origination of force. I thought of answering him then, but the chairman 
was too quick for me. I will not answer him now, as he is not present, but 
I think the popular theory of causation is not entirely satisfactory, the 
common theory is, that it is simply a sequence— that it consists of an ante- 
cedent and a consequent. That may cover a great deal of causation, but 
there is something in my idea of causation which is not entirely satisfied 
with it. We form entirely different ideas of a cause from a mere ante- 
cedent and consequent, and that idea of a cause is derived from our 
own self-consciousness. I know that I myself am the cause of certain 
things which re-act on my consciousness and are subject to the con ro 
of my will. I cannot think therefore that the present theory of 
causation is satisfactory. It is satisfactory so far as it gets rid of the 
older theories of causation adopted by the ancient philosophy. I is 
upon a true theory of causation that I think a very large portion of the proof 
of the existence of the Deity may very properly be based. But in addition 
to this I want to draw attention to one other very strong source of proof o 
the existence of the Deity apart from the mere evidence supplied by external 
nature, and that is the moral constitution of man. There is such a thing 
in existence as the idea of “ ought ’’-duty or whatever else you may like to 
call it. We always feel this sense of duty ; we cannot help it ; it is a part 
of our conscious being, and we. cannot get rid of it. T at P rove * 
that there is some law pervading the universe beyond the mere physics 
sequence of cause and effect-a moral law totally different m i,s character 
from the law which binds together material things, and the existence of that 
law proves the existence of a Being who is himself the source an 
author of that moral law. Now let me offer one brief criticism upon 
Mr Eeddie’s paper. I concur with the criticism m the latter part ot 
it as to our perception of external objects. If we analyze our percep- 
tions of matter, the truth is that the only things we are conscious of are th 
perceptions of our mind-the reports, so to speak, which are furnished hy our 
senses. They do not prove the externality of things-thatismatterof 
inference, and the only thing of which we have positive and distinct pio 
is unquestionably not the existence of matter, hut the existence of mind 
So true is that, that when you apply a rigid mental analysis, say - 
table, all you know of it is its length, breadth, thickness, hardness, and its 
other qualities, and when you come to seek for the matter ^ you do n find 
it at all. But I am quite prepared to concur with Mr. Eeddie m thick d 
that the existence of matter is an actual fact. It must not he supposed 
that I do not attach very great weight to the common sense view o 
mankind that there is a definite and independent existence of what we 
