003 
friend. Now, if the animal had retired to the road-side and 
placed its head between its paws, it would perhaps have been 
difficult to show that it was not employed in forming a rational 
judgment \ but as the case stood, the dog^s demeanour 
evidenced nothing more than a balance of desires. And 
whenever an animal appears to hesitate as to what' it shall 
do, we may always find this principle at the bottom of its 
hesitation. 
10. This state of equilibrium is very different from intel- 
lectual judgment or rather from the state of inaction which 
precedes and is necessary to the formation of an intellectual 
judgment. A human being may find himself in precisely the 
same condition as that which I have just mentioned, and his 
course of action may be finally decided, as in the case of the 
brute, by a destruction of the equilibrium ; and, so far, he 
merely acts under the influence of his instinct. But when he 
proceeds to form an intellectual judgment, his mode of opera- 
tion is different. He places his mind by an act of the rational 
will m a condition of suspense ; so far from being led by his 
inclinations, he voluntarily withdraws his attention from those 
objects which are likely to influence his desires, in order that 
his intellect may work freely. He refuses to be governed by 
the accumulated impressions, stored up and spontaneously 
presented to him by his memory • on the contrary, he searches 
his memory for fresh data, or consults the opinions of others. 
Ihe difierence then between the human being and the brute, 
so far as regards the faculty of judgment, consists in this' 
that the action of the brute is determined by the facts which 
are present to his consciousness at the time of the action 
whereas the human being, although placed in contact with the 
same facts, has the power of suspending his action, and direct- 
ing his mind in quest of fresh facts by which his conduct may 
be regulated ; and it does not militate against this distinction 
that the power is not always exercised. 
. Again, abstraction and generalization only become 
intellectual when they are utilized by the intellect. A bull is 
irritated by a red colour, and not by the object of which red- 
ness is a property ; but it would be absurd to say that the 
bull voluntarily abstracts the phenomenon of redness from 
these objects. The process is essentially one of abstraction, 
i o n 8 * the - Same time it} is entirel 7 automatic. 
. Or, coming to generalization, let us suppose a mouse 
encountering a cat for the first time in his life ; aud let us 
lurther suppose that he is not afraid of cats, in consequence 
of his ignorance of their habits. But, being injured or 
intimidated by the cat, he takes care, if he is lucky enough 
