304 
to escape, to avoid cats for the future; and this phenomenon 
is accounted for by the principle of the 
sions so far as concerns that particular cat. -out it ins 
experience of cats is to be of any use to him, it is necessary 
that he should avoid other cats also; and, in fact, we sha 
find that h?s fear is not confined to the, individual cat m 
Question but is extended to the whole species; that is, he has 
generalized from a single instance. On his second encounter 
with a cat he may be conceived to reason syllogistically, and 
to argue from his general rule to a particukr instance, 
have to be avoided: this is a cat; therefore it has to b„ 
aV 13 de Thus the brute abstracts and generalizes and reasons 
syllogistically, but he is unconscious of doing so. His p y- 
chological machinery works in the same way as that «f a 
Tinman being 1 but lie cannot control its workings, ueita 
Ses of an object engage his attention to the exctorf 
oilier Qualities, which are disregarded ; and thus h e abstia . , 
antomaticaUv The image of aS object having been imprinted 
Z‘Z‘X%, a.e feelings 
or, his memory, and on the reproduction ot the image tne.e 
feelings and the actions resulting therefrom are reproduced 
likewise : thus he coots from experience, automaUcally sth.lhe 
im T rA S 6 t 
and thusVe 6 generalizes, automatically also. And , , f* '. to syllo- 
gistic reasoning, the explanation is very 
when philosophers came to examine the n ^ in „ 
and brute, and, like the faculties of abstraction U., 7 
becomes intellectual when we choose to make it so. 
14. It may be asked why, m cases where the human being 
acts from reason, may we not assume that the lower 1 
do the same ? Why do we deny to the brute the power 
pTseTt^kMW^ theZtoe Cd hJectThis actions ? We may 
tion, inasmuch as the inclination to aot ™^^"Xto 
common to all animals similarly T£.f the obvious, 
all animals of the same species. We find that the obm , 
and I think I may say, exclusive, object of these mciin 
