305 
is to preserve himself and to propagate his species ; and the 
animal, so far as he himself and his species are concerned, does 
nothing else. He does not either improve or deteriorate 
psychologically; he is in precisely the same condition now 
that he was in hundreds of years ago. We find that his 
instincts are capable of being called into action by the associa- 
tion of impressions which I have mentioned above, and we 
find that he is thereby enabled to act in conformity with cir- 
cumstances for which he was not originally provided. Why 
then, should we invest him with reason, for which he has no 
use, which is inferior to instinct as a means to the only object 
he ever carries out ?— for even we often find that in moments 
of peril, when our intellectual faculties are paralyzed, it is 
instinct that comes to the rescue. The brute has now and then 
an internal conflict as to what he shall do or shall not do, but 
it is not a conflict between reason and desire : it is a conflict 
between one desire and another. He may avoid an action 
because a similar action has been in a former case attended 
with painful consequences; or, again, he may perform an 
action because it has previously proved beneficial to him. 
But he gives no indication that he has any comprehension of 
abstract good or evil : he is guided entirely by his inclination, 
and there is no moral standard, however low, by which we can 
judge him. The remark which I have seen somewhere that 
the dog stands in the same relation to his master as his master 
does to God, is valueless, until it can be shown that the im- 
mediate hope of reward and the immediate fear of punish- 
ment are the sole inducements to virtue. The animal is, in 
fact, an automaton, but he is an automaton of Divine con- 
struction. He has sensations and desires, but these are simply 
the wires by which he is worked, and without which he would 
speedily become extinct. He has memory, but his memory 
does not retain ideas ; for, in the higher sense of the term, he 
has none. He has, by means of his memory, associations of 
impressions, but these associations, by awakening his instincts 
reguiate his conduct automatically. 3 
15.1 cannot close these remarks without adverting to an 
assertion which we commonly meet with, that the theory of a 
mental distinction between man and brute is grounded on 
jealousy. It appears to me to be highly probable that the 
opposite theory is equally unscientific in its origin. At all 
events, this seems to be Lord Brougham\s view.* He says : - 
“ The sceptical or free-thinking philosophers always lowered human nature 
as much as possible. They regarded it as something gained to their argu- 
* “ Dialogues on Instinct; 
