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“ The animal is in fact an automaton, but he is an automaton of divine 
construction.” 
The term “ automatic ” is used with great liberality, and I am surprised to find 
things which I should call high intellectual operations, involving induction and 
other intellectual principles, designated here as. being automatic ; for I find 
such operations ranked in my books as very high intellectual operations. 
But it seems to me that one of the great errors in the paper is its great want 
of definition. Within what bounds is the natural sagacity of which the author 
speaks, limited ? In the second section, however, the author speaks of his 
cat ; but he has not dealt fairly with it. It rushes to the door when he 
drives it ; but this only exhibits a small amount of sagacity. If I had a cat 
that, wanting to go out, “mewed” at me and scratched at the door until I 
opened it, I would not think it involved a very high act of reason on the 
animal’s part, but something denoting the presence of mind. Now a doo- 
would probably go a step beyond the cat ; if unable to get out by making a 
noise, it would lick my hand, and thus draw attention to its wishes. That 
goes much beyond what the author lays down for natural sagacity, and I 
cannot understand operations of that kind, without ascribing to the animal a 
certain amount of mind. Its ideas are limited, but there is a certain 
analogy between its acts and my own. But then the author disputes my 
right to argue, because I see a cat drawing inferences like a being possessed 
of intellectuality, that I am entitled to infer that it denotes the presence of 
mind. If I cannot argue from myself to the animal, I cannot argue at all. 
The only ground I have to go upon is by judging what should I do 
under similar circumstances to those in which the animal is placed ; 
unless I did that, it would be impossible to arrive at any theory with 
regard to the powers of the animal. I agree with Mr. Morshead in thinking 
that a very large portion of the acts of animals are instinctive, as he states in 
the fourth paragraph, when speaking of the bee, with whose habits I am 
well acquainted. Of course there can be no doubt that in the construction of 
its cell it is directed by a knowledge which is unquestionably not its own ; but 
at the same time, when we admit this, it forms no reason for denying 'that 
the bee has a certain amount of knowledge of some kind ; for I have seen that 
under certain circumstances they can, and do, modify their forms of archi- 
tecture. Bees do not form their cells exactly parallel to one another. In 
taking up a hive of bees when the comb has not been perfectly formed, I 
have given it a shake, and one comb has fallen down. That forms a very 
serious obstacle to the bees in building, according to their usual principles ; 
but if you have ever noticed an accident of this kind, you will find that bees 
are capable of modifying the whole of their architecture to meet such a 
difficulty. They have a sufficient degree of intelligence for that. Mr. Mors- 
head seems to think that these animals are guided purely by instinct. No 
doubt they are guided by it in a very great degree. Now I will define 
what I mean by instinct. The only correct definition of instinct is that of an 
irresistibly strong feeling impelling a human being or an animal to a particular 
