Last midsummer a case came under my observation, which, to my mind, con- 
clusively showed that an animal possesses mental power as well as instinct. 
I ascended the Flesone with my wife and another lady. They rode on mules. 
The animal that my wife rode was a kind of king of the mules of Chamouni ; 
the lady who was with us rode a small mule, which was put first, with the 
guide to lead it ; but I could not get the king mule to go on ; when we 
reversed the order of the mules, instead of having to drive the king mule, it 
went fast enough. Now some process of reasoning must have taken place 
in the king mule. In this case the difficulty simply arose from our folly in 
placing the king of the mules in a wrong position. I would not attribute to 
animals any high rational power, but I cannot account for some things on 
the simple principle of instinct or mere natural sagacity. Animals are 
capable of the comparison of such ideas as they have, though those ideas 
are very limited. I do not think they can reflect on their ideas, but I 
think that there is every reason for believing that they are capable of com- 
paring their limited ideas, and that they have certain ideas which ap- 
proximate towards morality. Take the case of a dog. He gets thoroughly 
ashamed of himself when he has done something wrong. I have it on 
good authority that a good pointer who goes out with a bad shot gets 
very soon disgusted, and after a time will not work at all Then take the case 
of pigeons. I know a case of a tame pigeon which paired with another. The 
cock and the hen set alternately on the eggs, and I have seen the hen pigeon, 
after she has had her turn, deliberately come out of the nest and drive the 
cock in to set on the eggs. (Laughter.) I maintain that shows an intelligence 
beyond what we can attribute to instinct. (Hear, hear.) I cannot see why 
any one has a right to assume the whole point at issue, and to say that an 
animal is a mere automaton. Then as to the capabilities for education which 
exist in animals, let any one go to Regent’s Park ; there is not a single animal 
in the Zoological Gardens which has not learnt to be a beggar. (Laughter.) 
For instance, there is a seal in one of the basins ; it creeps out upon the stone 
which surrounds the water, and begs for anything it can get. Last autumn I 
saw this animal come out of the water, and the people would not give him 
anything to eat ; and the animal soon gave them a splashing by plunging into 
the water. Shortly afterwards a keeper made his appearance, and the 
animal had been so well taught that it came out of the water, received its 
food, and returned in a quiet manner. I cannot account for that as an act 
of pure instinct ; to my mind it showed that the animal had powers which 
were capable of instruction ; and if that is so, it must have had some degree 
of mental power. (Cheers.) 
Rev. J. B. Owen.— I want to ask if the objection you take to the word “ au- 
tomatic” is, that it is incorrectly applied to the active phenomena of instinct ? 
Mr. Row.— My objection is that the word “automatic” is applied to 
several acts recorded in this paper, which are the highest acts of reason on 
the part of man, and which we consider as belonging to high mental processes. 
Mr. Owen. Then I do not think there is any real difference between you 
and Mr. Morshead. An automaton, we know, in its simple Greek meaning, 
VOL. V. 2 A 
