317 
Spirit in the New Testament ought properly to be understood of that gift of 
the Holy Ghost which is given to us at our baptism and regeneration ; but I 
think the answer to this was contained in what was said at the time, that 
the Holy Ghost could not be otherwise than blameless, and would be pre- 
served blameless, and that S. Paul therefore (1 Thess. v. 23) could not so have 
used the word. 
Mr. R. W. Dibden. — You spoke of bees feeling the way the wind blows. 
But suppose the wind had changed after the capture of the bee, then, accord- 
ing to your theory, the bee would not arrive at home at all. 
Mr. James. The bee would not be wholly guided by the wind. It would 
have its eyes, and be able to see a long way. 
Mr. Row. It would be a rational act of judgment if they went by the 
wind. (Hear, hear.) 
Rev. Sir Tilson Marsh. — I have listened with much pleasure to the 
speeches many of them of great ability — which have been delivered this 
evening, but I have come to the conclusion that we cannot fix the exact line 
of distinction between instinct and reason. The two qualities seem to trench 
on one another, and an instance of that occurs to my mind now. A farmer 
in Suffolk, who was in the habit of going to the county town where a market 
was held once a fortnight, possessed a dog. The farmer often went to the 
town early in the morning, and one winter’s morning he went at six o’clock, 
accompanied by his dog. On the journey the horse slipped and fell, and the 
master was thrown and broke his leg, and lay helpless in the road. The dog 
appeared anxious : the farmer made signs to it to go home, but it would not 
stir. At last it occurred to the master that the animal wanted some authentic 
testimony of the accident. The farmer’s flesh had been wounded, so he took 
out his handkerchief, dipped it in the blood, and gave it to the dog, which 
immediately seized it and ran home with its credentials. That is a well- 
authenticated case, and it does show that instinct at times approximates 
most closely to reason. But I fall back upon the definition which was given 
at our last meeting. I believe that the powers of animals all come under 
one term, as included in the $vxv. The distinctive powers of man, such as 
generalization, which is evidently confined to humanity, come under the 
term 7r vtvpa } and I believe this difference would account for the divine state- 
ment made by St. Paul when he speaks of to 6\oic\r)pov * as consisting of <ru>pa f 
4 /v X 1 J} and irvtvpa. No doubt there are cases to show that ipvxn and Trvtvpa 
have been used at times as if convertible terms ; but if you inquire into 
that special use, you will obtain an answer to any objection which may be 
urged. Allowing that there is this trinity in man, the \pvxv and it v tv pa 
express j;he higher nature, the being the lower of the two portions, and 
the ir v tv pa being the superior intellectual and spiritual power. There is one 
- \ t ^kess. V i ^e W01 ’d is here used as a substantive neuter, 6Ad/c\npov 
<1)V ' ^ 0U tt) v ’ !L ee Wetstein, &c. — “ Quod omnibus suis partibus con- 
see Wolfius. — Ed. 
vpujv 
stat ” 
