cannot be more than certain, and if less than absolutely cer- 
tain, it is not certain. The same view may be taken of the 
abstract idea of assent. It is a fact that viewing the ques- 
tion ideally, a proposition can be true only, and cannot be 
more true or less true. But yet mankind unanimously concur 
in speaking of degrees of truth. The forms of language imply 
degrees of assent, and although not to an equal extent, de- 
grees of certainty varying as to the character of the evidence. 
But Dr. -Newman admits, and I entirely concur with him, that 
it is impossible to construct mental science on mere ideal 
conception of what ought to be. We must content ourselves 
with the facts of human nature. If we use correct language, 
so as to free our notions of assent, truth, and certainty from all 
conditions, the result will follow that there will be very few 
things left which we can either assent to, be certain of, or 
believe to be true. But Dr. Newman has no intention to 
reduce the number of our assents or certainties to a minimum, 
but to make a great number of uncertainties assume the aspect 
of certainties. His position, therefore, appears to me to be 
inconsistent with his own principles, and although it may 
have some degree of ideal truth, it is no account of the facts 
of human nature. It confounds between ideal and relative 
truth ; and the greater portion of our assents and certainties 
are relative and not ideal ones. The position taken by 
him is the first step in the ladder whereby he would get us 
to accept a number of propositions resting on very contingent 
evidence as unconditionally true ; or, in one word, that our 
faith may be stronger than the foundation on which it 
rests. 
17. Accordingly he proceeds to make a vigorous assault on 
Locke and others for maintaining the contrary. Dr. Newman 
seems to me to argue on the principle, that if we dispute the 
correctness of his views we must assume that actual demon- 
stration is necessary for every form of certitude; and that 
if the element of probability enters into our premisses we 
never can get even relative certitude into the conclusion. He 
quotes Locke at considerable length, where he maintains that 
our certitudes of truths ought not to rise higher than the evi- 
dence which supports them. Unless I misunderstand Dr. 
Newman, he lays down a position analogous to the admission 
that although the strength of a chain is no greater than that 
of its weakest link, it will support a weight equal to that of 
its strongest. 
18. To establish his point, Dr. Newman enters on a minute 
examination of the distinction between inference and assent. 
All inferences he asserts to be conditioned on the premisses. 
