57 
In one class of subjects,, then, assent certainly is always un- 
conditional ; but if the word stands for an undoubting and 
unhesitating act of the mind once, why does it not denote the 
same always ? ” I should have supposed that a person who 
has but one-hundredth portion of the logical genius of Dr. 
Newman would have seen the fallacy of this reasoning. r J he 
latter portion is answered by the simple question, If once 
in unconditioned matter, why should it be always so in 
conditional matter ? 
28. But our author rests a considerable portion of his case on 
the fact that Locke and others admit that there is a kind of 
contingent proof which approximates to the force of demon- 
stration. Our assents and beliefs, therefore, can assume a 
more absolute form than the foundations on which they are 
based. I am quite ready to admit that there are kinds of 
moral evidence which produce in the mind the feeling of 
absolute certainty; but this by no means establishes the 
truth that our assents can be unconditioned when the evidence 
only justifies a merely probable conclusion. 
29. To all practical purposes 1 + \ + i + &c. ad infinitum = 2, 
although I admit that to elaborate the strict metaphysics of 
this is very difficult. In the same manner certain kinds of 
moral evidence are calculated to produce, in the conclusion 
which results from them, all the force of demonstration. 
Dr. Newman admits that we must give up theories and 
make a simple appeal to facts. For the rationale of this, I 
answer, the mind is so formed as to see that it is so. Evi- 
dence much less than ad infinitum . , even only where four or 
five independent lines of proof meet in a common centre, is 
of equal force as demonstration, and proves the impossibility 
of the contradictory being true. One or two links of such 
evidence do not produce this result, but the whole series do ; 
and the possibility of error is sufficiently eliminated, when a 
sufficient number of the terms converge in a common centre. 
The evidence does not consist of a mere balance of proba- 
bilities, and it is to such alone that the idea of contingent is 
properly applicable. 
30. Let us take an example. A single indication of appa- 
rent contrivance, skill, or design, is not sufficient to prove 
that the thing in which it exists had an intelligent author, 
though it may make it highly probable ; still less would one 
or two instances prove that the universe was the creation of a 
divine mind. But the more we increase the number of such 
instances, the higher is the certainty of the conclusion ; but 
when they are indefinitely multiplied, and all converge in a 
common centre, the possibility of this being the result of 
