59 
32. I fully admit with Dr. Newman that the number of princi- 
ples to which the mind is formed to assent independently of 
reasoning processes is large. They all partake in the nature 
of intuitions. Those which are not self-evident, or rest on 
the testimony of consciousness, for want of a better word, 
may be designated instinctive. To constitute them such, it 
is not necessary that they should be felt by all men ; it will be 
sufficient that they should be entertained by a large majority 
of mankind. The numerous attempts which have been made 
to resolve these principles into higher ones have ended in no 
satisfactory result. In all reasonings they must be assumed 
as ultimate facts in human nature. Such assents are all 
absolute. Let it be observed, however, that multitudes mis- 
take conditional for absolute truth, and the unconditional 
nature of their assents is owing to this mistake. We must 
also carefully discriminate between the assents which I have 
mentioned, and those which we make at the mere bidding of 
our moral nature. It seems to me that some of the most 
serious errors in Dr. Newman^s work have originated in not 
attending to this distinction. He also further observes that we 
give assent to things which lie quite beyond the limits of formal 
logic. I think that this is correct as far as the purely deduc- 
tive processes of the intellect are concerned. But it is deeply 
to be regretted, although he frequently alludes to the prin- 
ciples of induction, that he has given us no analysis of them. 
If he means that it is impossible to exhibit the principle of 
induction in forms of thought such as, although they will not 
secure us from error, will greatly diminish our danger of 
falling into it, he is doing much to subvert all our principles 
of certainty. He appears largely to identify it with the 
“ illative faculty,” mentioned at the conclusion of his work. 
33. On the same principle on which Dr. Newman asserts that 
all assents must be absolute, he denies that certitude admits 
of degrees. Ideally he is right; but in a practical view of 
human nature we have nothing to do with ideal certitude 
or ideal truth. We have to deal with the feeling of certitude 
as it exists in individual men. As a practical fact we habitu- 
ally speak of being more or less certain, and say that a thing 
is more or less true. If we confine our use of the words assent, 
truth, and certitude to those cases only where our assents are 
absolute, the truth indefectible, and the certitude perfect, 
our assents, truths, and certitudes will be reduced to the 
narrowest limits. The mode in which Dr. Newman puts the 
whole question seems to me to give us no refuge between 
unhesitating submission to authority or scepticism. 
