60 
34. I must adhere to the general principle, that all our con- 
victions are absolute or contingent according to the foundation 
on which they are erected, and that our beliefs ought not to 
be stronger than the basis which support them. Certitude, 
in the ordinary sense of that word, means a conviction resting 
on what the individual mind feels to be a very strong foun- 
^35. I cannot help thinking that there is a good deal of con- 
fusion in Dr. Newman’s analysis of certitude. It may be worth 
while briefly to examine what we mean when we say that we are 
certain of a thing. Certitude differs in some degree from assent, 
belief, or conviction. It involves each of these states of mind, 
and something more in addition. This alone is a sufficient proo 
that assent cannot be absolute. Now, I have already admitted 
that certitude in its ideal sense does not admit of degree . 
Truth, as Dr. Newman says, is truth, and cannot be othei- 
wise But this is to do what he again and again protests 
against as unphilosophical, viz., to take refuge m abstrac- 
tions. Such certitude is not human certitude, because, as 
every man knows, or rather ought to know, tWman has no 
the gift of infallibility. I object, therefore, to Dr. Newman s 
expression, “the indefectibility of certitude, as confusing 
between an abstract conception and a concrete thing. W 
mean by certitude, a conviction about which no reasonable 
doubt exists. I contend that all these mental phenomena as 
they are actual things and not ideal conceptions, admit ot 
de 36 6 But there is anotherclass of propositions frequently alluded 
to by Dr. Newman as supporting his views, of which we are 
absolutely certain, yet the evidence of them is continge^- 
“Ireland,” says he, “is an island. We are absolutely 
certain of it; yet the proof of it is contingent We have 
never sailed round it, or perhaps seen one who has. this 
at once brings us to the question as to how far various lines 
of evidence, each of which may be contingent separately, 
when they meet in a common centre lead to an absolutecon- 
elusion. Why do I believe the assertion that Ireland is. an 
island, and disbelieve that of Lemuel Gulliver, that there is a 
flying one called Laputa ? I reply that there is a pnncip e in 
the mind which cannot help recognising the impossibility of 
error as the result of a certain amount of evidence, which 
converges in a common centre. I am not concerned wi 
the question whether this conviction is the result of a primary 
principle, or rests on an acquired habit of the mind. It is 
sufficient that it exists, and is calculated to produce as ‘strong 
a feeling of certainty as demonstration. The conclusion leg - 
